Key Stakeholders of the Russian Arctic Politics



Arctida

The Arctida non-profit organization conducts studies and investigations connected to the Russian Arctic and transforms their results into advice and recommendations for decision-makers on various levels, in local communities, governments, industries and nonprofits.

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INTRODUCTION

The Russian Federation controls 53% (24,140 km) of the Arctic Ocean's coastline — its shores are washed by the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea. The Arctic is strategically important both for Russian domestic and foreign policy. Russia's Arctic zone includes territories of nine Russian regions: Murmansk Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, as well as parts of the Komi Republic, the Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Krasnoyarsk Krai and Arkhangelsk Oblast. The zone is regulated by federal law and is included in national strategic plans. Governmental and commercial stakeholders in Russia's Arctic influence the entire Arctic region. This is due to aforementioned reasons, as well as due to the length of the coastline and the fact that most of the region's natural resources are concentrated in Russian territorial waters.

We have identified and analyzed 828 key stakeholders of Russia's Arctic to determine who had the most influence in forming and implementing Russia's Arctic policy. The study sample included key executive and legislative agencies of Russia; business

associations and representatives of ultra-big business; expert and intergovernmental organizations; as well as representatives of the key security institution: the Security Council of Russia's committee on Arctic.

The study includes three units: description of the geopolitical significance of the Arctic for the entire world and for Russia in particular; description of key stakeholders in the context of federal influence groups; analysis of Arctic stakeholders in the regional context.

Chapter I is dedicated to global economic, environmental, climatic and geopolitical risks, as well as to non-Arctic actors' interests in the Arctic.

Chapter II provides a context for the Arctic region's significance to Russia and describes Russia's national interests.

Chapter III describes the methodology of the research, as well as how the list of top 20 most influential federal stakeholders was formed, and the analysis of influence groups and influential individuals within each one of them.

Chapter IV looks at the top 20 stakeholders in the regional context. This section includes short profiles on the most influential of the Arctic region's governors.

Chapter V contains the results of the study based on analyzing the key Arctic stakeholders of Russia.

Chapter VI highlights the risks that are caused by Russia's policies and directly influence the geopolitical, economic and environmental situation in the entire Arctic.

I.

THE ARCTIC REGION FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:

climate change and its socio-economic and political consequences

The Arctic region attracts previously unseen amounts of interest by researchers due to unprecedented climate change. From 1971 to 2017, the average annual temperature in the Arctic rose by 2.7 degrees Celsius; in the cold season (from October to May) the rise is 3.1 degrees. In the same period, the snow cover shrunk by more than 30%. Patches of thick, multi-year ice are replaced by one-year ice. The cause of these transformations lies in climate change: melting of the ice is connected with rising average annual temperature and increasing precipitations[1]. The situation is made worse by the cumulative effects produced by melting ice: the dark (watery) surface increases, while bright surface (snow, ice) decreases, which leads to reduced albedo (reflective capacity) of the region. More solar radiation is absorbed, which stimulates the ice sheet to melt further[2]. As a result, the Arctic becomes hotter at a quicker pace than other macroregions of the Earth.

About 70% of the ice mass reduction from 1991 to 2010 was due to human-caused climate change. As the loss of ice mass is considered the main reason for the global sea level rise in the 20th century, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that the environmental processes in the Arctic influence the entire world[3]. The Arctic society has a saying: "what happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic"[4]. However, important Arctic-related political decisions are frequently made far outside the region, and the array of various international organizations, states, businesses, indigenous peoples and non-profit organizations

1 Box J. E. et al. Key indicators of Arctic climate change: 1971–2017 // Environmental Research Letters. – 2019. – Vol. 14. – №. 4. – P. 1-18.
2 Keil K. The Arctic in a global energy picture: international determinants of Arctic oil and gas development // Governing Arctic Change. – Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017. – P. 280.
3 Marzeion B. et al. Attribution of global glacier mass loss to anthropogenic and natural causes // Science. – 2014. – Vol. 345. – №. 6199. – P. 919-921.
4 Keil K., 2017. – P. 280.

is so complex[5] that a close look at the general picture of Arctic development must never ignore peculiarities of national policies.

Arctic sea routes: unprecedented opportunities and structural limitations

The unprecedented increase of the available Arctic sea routes is a key climate-related change in the region that directly impacts society, economy and politics. This is due to the fact that one-year ice became the dominating type of ice in the Arctic Ocean[6]; it is predicted that by the mid-21st century the Arctic Ocean will have no ice sheet at all during summer. If this happens, PC3[7] icebreakers that can move through multi-year ice all year round will be able to navigate 90% of the Arctic territory. PC6-class ships (used to move through one-year ice) will be able to navigate 60% of the Arctic territory all year round by the end of the century.

The most significant changes in navigation opportunities will happen within international territories of the Arctic shelf. Their availability for PC3 ships will grow from 4% in late 20th century to 73% in the late 21st century[8]. Russia is the main beneficiary of the melting of ice, as most parts opening due to the warming are within the Russian Arctic shelf[9]. In general, the active melting of Arctic ice helps the development of three northern routes: 1) the Northwest Passage; 2) the Northern Sea Route (NSR); 3) the Transpolar Sea Route (through the North Pole). Using these routes can reduce the length of the usual sea routes by 25 to 30 percent, especially for shipping between the Baltic or the North Sea and the ports of East Asia.

5 Stephen K. Societal impacts of a rapidly changing Arctic // Current climate change reports. – 2018. – T. 4. – №. 3. – P. 223.
6 Ibid. – P. 15.
7 Ice classes according to the International Association of Classification Societies
8 Stephenson S. R. et al. Projected 21st-century changes to Arctic marine access // Climatic Change. – 2013. – Vol. 118. – №. 3. – P. 890-895.
9 Ibid. – P. 885.

Figure 1. Arctic sea routes diagram

Source: Stephenson S. R. et al., 2013

However, transport capacities of the Arctic region are far from limitless. According to the Russian government's plan for development of the NSR, the goal is to ship 80 million tons of goods in 2024; 150 million tons in 2030; 220 million tons in 2035. Despite such optimistic prognoses from the government, there's a number of obstacles to achieving these target indicators. Firstly, each Arctic route contains parts that are affected by seasonal uncertainties, which is a factor that is very hard to predict[10] (for example, the Laptev Sea within the NSR). Secondly, Arctic routes will be dominated

10 Stephenson S. R. et al. Projected 21st-century changes to Arctic marine access // Climatic Change. – 2013. – Vol. 118. – №. 3. – P. 895-896.

by on-demand transshipments (oil, ore, grain), while liner container-shipping will only develop to a limited extent, as it requires much more navigational predictability[11]. Thirdly, Arctic sea routes only have a limited capacity for transit traffic: the farther south the departure point lies, the less profitable the routes become; they are also more expensive and less profitable from the point of navigational predictability and maintenance of goods. Fourthly, winter shipping will always be more expensive due to inevitable presence of ice, albeit not always multi-year ice, and hence high prices of cargo insurance, limited ship speed due to the need to avoid icebergs (whose number is going to grow due to climate change), as well as fees paid to sea route operators. Fifthly, the profitability of shipments may get lower due to expensive icebreaker freight or the need to invest in construction of icebreakers, as well as due to undeveloped navigation tools; for example, only 6% of Arctic waters are mapped in accordance with international standards[12].

Arctic resources: a new El Dorado or a challenge for humanity?

The growth of the Arctic's logistic potential significantly increases the attractiveness of energy projects in the region, which has 30% of the world's untapped gas reserves and 13% of the world's unexplored oil reserves. Gas reserves are considered more promising, and most of them are within the Russian Arctic shelf[13].

According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (came into force in 1994), the Arctic shelf whose borders are located 200 miles away from the shore constitutes sovereign waters of Arctic countries; these waters have the status of exclusive economic zones

11 Guy E., Lasserre F. Commercial shipping in the Arctic: new perspectives, challenges and regulations // Polar Record. – 2016. – Vol. 52. – №. 3. – P. 295.
12 Ibid. – P. 296-298.
13 Gautier D. L. et al. Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas in the Arctic // Science. – 2009. – Vol. 324. – №. 5931. – P. 1175.

Draugen oil platform, Norway | Jan-Rune Smenes Reite

(EEZ). The rest of the Arctic is considered a heritage of mankind, and if a country wants to increase their continental shelf at the expense of this territory, it has to submit an application to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The application must consist of a science-based assessment. Based on the data provided, the Commission makes recommendations on the shelf limits, after which new borders are established; all countries must acknowledge them.

Right now, countries of the Arctic Council argue amongst each other, aiming to increase their respective continental shelf territories. One of the best examples is the struggle for control over the Lomonosov Ridge. Russia, Canada and Denmark all claimed their rights for it in the UN. The struggle will only become more heated, if only because 46% of the entire Arctic shelf lies beyond sovereign EEZ jurisdictions. At the same time, most untapped oil and gas reserves are located beyond sovereign waters[14].

14 Gulas S. et al. Declining Arctic Ocean oil and gas developments: Opportunities to improve governance and environmental pollution control // Marine Policy. – 2017. – Vol. 75. – P. 53-54.

However, the Arctic's rich reserves do not guarantee that it's an El Dorado of energy resources. There is the issue of profitability of energy-related Arctic projects. Nearly all projects for extraction of hydrocarbons in the region are export-oriented, which means that they depend on the current economic and political situation in the world.

One example is various troubles surrounding Gazprom's Shtokman field in the Barents Sea. Originally the field was supposed to be used to supply liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the US; to this end, a joint company Shtokman Development AG was organized. Its investors included Gazprom, a French company Total and a Norwegian company Statoil. However, the shale revolution in the US that is likely to turn that country into an LNG exporter put a damper on the Shtokman project's business plan[15],

15 Keil K. The Arctic in a global energy picture: international determinants of Arctic oil and gas development // Governing Arctic Change. – Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017. – P. 285-286.

Exploration activities at Shtokman field | gazprom.ru

which led to the joint company's closure in 2019, while the project of putting the field onto operation has been delayed until 2029; the goal now is to supply LNG to the European market (unless sanctions against tanker shipments of gas are implemented)[16].

When prices of energy resources are low, expensive extraction of oil and gas in the north reduces the marginality of such projects. In this context, the general economic crisis that is already underway will reduce the interest towards natural resource extraction in the Arctic. It should also be said that the economic growth of China has been slower in recent years, and many of the Arctic projects (especially Russian ones) are chiefly aimed at the Chinese market.

We should also consider the worldwide trend towards decarbonization of the economy. This trend is directly related to the goals of reducing human-caused thawing of permafrost and of not allowing environmental disasters that happen because of natural resource extraction. In the next few years, the EU is expected to extend the carbon taxes to some of the raw materials, chiefly to metallurgical products. Due to this, many big Arctic shelf development projects might become unnecessary due to low demand for traditional energy resources. The "sanctions of the future", i.e. environmental sanctions that are implemented in response for violating safety rules while developing various environmentally hazardous projects in the Arctic, should also be taken into consideration. This might also become a severe limitation for energy-related projects. However, traditional natural resources are still in rather high demand, especially after usual supply chains were broken due to sanctions against Russia because of the war in Ukraine.

16 Shtokman is not forgotten. Gazprom is planning to put the field into operation in 2029 // Neftegaz.ru. – 2021. – URL: https://neftegaz.ru/news/spg-szhizhennyy-prirodnyy-gaz/665136-shtokman-ne-zabyt-gazprom-planiruet-vvesti-mestorozhdenie-v-ekspluatatsiyu-v-2029-g/

Environmental risks in the Arctic

The energy potential of the Arctic is not just a matter of countries struggling for access to natural resources, development of fields and looking for profitability. It is, first of all, one of the key factors for massive environmental and technological risks that are carried by new Arctic hydrocarbon extraction projects.

We must keep in mind that Arctic routes will be in demand mainly for transshipment cargo, i.e. shipping of oil products will dominate. This carries in itself additional risks of environmental disasters in cases of fuel spills. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, unlike in the Antarctic, shipping and using heavy fuel in the Arctic waters is not prohibited by any international conventions. The international law only has recommendations on decreasing such operations, although some countries regulate this issue on their own: for example, Norway limits the usage of mazut fuel on Svalbard[17].

17 Pelaudeix C. Governance of Arctic offshore oil & gas activities: multilevel governance & legal pluralism at stake // Arctic yearbook. – 2015. – P. 4.

Greenpeace demonstration during the meeting of Arctic Environment Ministers (Sweden, 2013)
GRID-Arendal, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Energy-related projects in the Arctic are hazardous for sea mammals, birds and fish whose habitat is highly localized and concentrated around the spots where raw materials are extracted during the warm time of year[18]. It is also known that acidification, i.e. raising levels of human-produced carbon dioxide in northern waters, increases the risks of reduction of marine biodiversity[19].

Another environmental risk related to development of Arctic resources is negative environmental consequences of thawing of permafrost. This process might influence the stability of buildings, utility grids and objects of infrastructure. If such constructions are situated in icy turf, then thawing might lead to catastrophic consequences. For example, the largest Arctic fuel spill in the history of Russia connected with destruction of a fuel tank belonging to Nornikel's subsidiary could have been caused by thawing of permafrost[20].

18 Gulas S. et al. Declining Arctic Ocean oil and gas developments: Opportunities to improve governance and environmental pollution control // Marine Policy. – 2017. – Vol. 75. – P. 55.

19 Yamanouchi T., Takata K. Rapid change of the Arctic climate system and its global influences-Overview of GRENE Arctic climate change research project (2011–2016) // Polar Science. – 2020. – Vol. 25. – P. 22.

20 Scientists check the condition of permafrost under a fuel tank in Norilsk // TASS. – 2020. – URL: https://tass.ru/obschestvo/9135921

Cleaning up of the Ambarnaya river after a fuel leak in Norilsk (2020) | nornickel.ru

The most efficient method of minimizing environmental risks is strategic environmental assessment (SEA). The idea of SEA is that no geological work can start without assessing all possible risks of developing new fields. However, this method is only used rarely[21], and it's only obligatory in Norway. Making this method widespread would be especially relevant nowadays: specialists say that there are no technologies that could fully neutralize the consequences of oil spills in the Arctic, regardless of the time of year[22].

Military and political risks related to climate change in the Arctic macroregion

As climate change mostly impacts the north, it should be of no surprise that the main international organization that deals with the region, the Arctic Council, was created due to the discussion on environmental problems. The council was created in 1996, and includes 8 countries: Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Russia, the US, Finland and Sweden. The increasing potential of the ship industry and natural resources extraction significantly increased the risks of environmental disasters caused by energy-related projects, e.g. oil spills. This is why the new council was supposed to develop a collaborative approach to fighting environmental risks caused by developing the Arctic. Six working groups were created that dealt directly with environmental issues: fighting the contamination of the Arctic; environmental monitoring; preventing emergencies; preservation of plant and animal life; etc.

However, the Arctic is becoming just as relevant in the military and political context as in the environmental

21 Tanaka Y. Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic under International Law: Risk and Responsibility, written by Rachael Lorna Johnstone // The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. – 2015. – Vol. 30. – №. 3. – P. 578.
22 Gulas S. et al. Declining Arctic Ocean oil and gas developments: Opportunities to improve governance and environmental pollution control // Marine Policy. – 2017. – Vol. 75. – P. 55.

one, especially if you consider the increasing transportation and energy-related possibilities of the region. The risk of militarization of the Arctic is growing due to the growing vulnerability of the critical infrastructure of the Arctic states. The probability of military and political conflicts is going to grow, especially in the absence of international bodies for arbitration of such conflicts.

Matters of military and political nature were deliberately excluded from constituent provisions of the Arctic Council[23], as such matters are seen as potential sources of conflict between participants and might paralyze collaborative decision-making. Focusing on the environment significantly limits the communication on political and economic issues, e.g. on those related to complications of synchronizing national and international laws that regulate the development of the Arctic. Also, the Arctic Council is considered a "soft law" organization that develops standards for the actors' behavior, but does not make legally binding decisions[24]. Therefore this intergovernmental organization has a limited capacity to influence change in the political status quo.

The situation became worse after the war in Ukraine started; this war caused a split in the Arctic Council. First, all the participating countries other than Russia decided to suspend their work in the organization. Such strong decision was made not only because of parties' disagreement with Russia's actions, but also because Russia is the chair of the Council from 2021 to 2023. However, on June 8, 2022 Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Norway, the US, Finland and Sweden decided to continue the Council's work on the projects that don't require Russia's participation.

23 Ronson A. Political climate change: The evolving role of the Arctic Council // Northern Review. – 2011. – №. 33. – P. 97.
24 Ibid. – P. 100.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov takes over the two-year Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council (Reykjavik, 2021) | Arctic Council, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

The US representatives stated that 60% to 75% of the projects can be realized without involving Russia, regardless of the sphere of the projects[25].

Another problem that prevents states from efficiently working on preventing and solving various environmental and technological disasters is major differences that exist in international agreements and various legal norms that regulate the Arctic. Various disasters (fuel spills, icebergs, floating ice, infrastructure failures) can fall under very different international rules regarding their prevention and elimination of consequences. For example, the order of determining exclusive economic zones in the Arctic is regulated by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This Convention only provides general norms and guidelines regarding all the other matters. There are also countries such as the US that have not ratified the Convention. Another example is the OSPAR Convention

25 The US Department of State claims that a bulk of the Arctic Council projects can be realized without Russia // TASS. – 2022. – URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/16080773

(1992) that regulates the protection of the sea environment in the North-East Atlantic, including issues of elimination of various types of contamination, as well as assessing the quality of the sea environment and biodiversity. This convention was ratified by all European countries of the Arctic Council except Russia. At the same time, there is another convention that regulates a similar issue: the OPRC Convention (International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation). It was ratified by Russia and other countries of the Arctic Council (adopted in 1990). OPRC Convention's weakness lies in the fact that most of its provisions are recommendatory in nature[26], although its adoption led to conclusion of several bilateral agreements on exchanging technical information and consultations as part of counteracting contamination of the Arctic. Such variations in the structure of regulations, as well as prevalence of recommendatory regulations, significantly reduce the potential of Arctic countries to prevent environmental disasters.

Tension points in the Arctic: security dilemma

With Arctic space becoming more suitable for transportation, and due to changes in the global energy market, new military and political tension points are developing in the region. The situation was further complicated when the war in Ukraine began, and this leads to the militarization of the region, with Finland and Sweden (both Arctic states) planning to join NATO. This will inevitably lead to increased military presence of Russia in the Arctic.

The current situation has already been described as the security dilemma, i.e. a situation when countries increase their military presence in a region, which is perceived as preparation to launch an attack, which leads to further

26 Pelaudeix C. Governance of Arctic offshore oil & gas activities: multilevel governance & legal pluralism at stake // Arctic yearbook. – 2015. – P. 3-5.

Russian Northern Fleet marines exercise in Chukotka | mil.ru

militarization of a region to maintain military and strategic parity[27]. Increasing revisionism of Russia's foreign policy, especially after 2014, is considered to be one of the causes behind this situation. Several Russian military bases that were abandoned after the end of the Cold War have been relaunched. Russian strategic bombers started patrolling Arctic frontiers again. The number of anti-aircraft and reconnaissance forces has been increasing[28]. NATO activities have also been on the rise since the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. In the spring of 2022, the Norwegian Sea saw the largest-scale Arctic NATO military exercises in 30 years. They involved 27 countries and about 30,000 military personnel[29] (Cold Response 2022). Russia's response to the exercises was negative;

27 Wither J. K. An Arctic security dilemma: assessing and mitigating the risk of unintended armed conflict in the High North // European Security. – 2021. – Vol. 30. – №. 4. – P. 649-666.

28 Laruelle M. Russia's Arctic policy: A power strategy and its limits. – 2020. – P. 5-29.

29 Exercise Cold Response 2022 – NATO and partner forces face the freeze in Norway // NATO. – 2022. – URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_192351.htm?selectedLocale=en

U.S. Marines hike to a training area prior to Exercise Cold Response 2022 (Setermoen, Norway) | ZUMA Press

it stated that they created a risk of unintended conflict in the Arctic[30].

Apart from risks of conflicts in the Arctic because of tensions between Russia, the US and China, there are several Arctic territories that are historically problematic from the geopolitical point of view. These are strategic zones that are in the middle of struggle for influence between several interested parties. We're talking about both small Arctic countries and remote northern autonomous islands whose strategic position means they're inevitably at the center of clashing interests of great powers.

Iceland. This northernmost European country is becoming more and more significant when it comes to issues of Arctic security. The reasons are the country's

30 V. Sokirko. "The Threat of a Conflict in the Arctic Has Ceased to Be Merely Theoretical". Russia believes that NATO is creating "risks of unintended conflicts" in the Arctic region // Gazeta.ru. – 2022. – URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2022/04/18/14749502.shtml

strategic location and the importance of the GIUK gap (the naval space between Greenland, Iceland and the UK that constitutes a line of NATO defense against Russia's potential use of submarines and military ships). Before 2006, a major US military base called Keflavik was operational in Iceland. After 2014, it was relaunched due to increased activity of the Russian submarine fleet in the Arctic waters and due to flights of Russian fighter planes over Iceland[31]. The US allocated additional funding for the Keflavik infrastructure to monitor the activities of Russian naval forces. Iceland is of interest not only to NATO, but also to China: in 2018, an Icelandic-Chinese observatory for scientific research was established in Iceland; it is the largest scientific observatory in the country[32]. Iceland itself perceives its strategic position in the Arctic as a challenge, as it maintains a policy of neutrality and states that it has no wish to be dragged into any military conflicts[33].

31 Schultz T. NATO and Washington worry about Russian subs // DW. – 2018. – URL: https://www.dw.com/en/nato-and-washington-worry-about-russian-subs-in-the-high-north/a-43533440

32 Bowman L., Xu Q. China in the Arctic: Policies, strategies, and opportunities for Alaska // Fairbanks: Center for Arctic Policy Studies. – 2020. – P. 4.

33 Zandee D., Kruijver K., Stoetman A. Future of Arctic security // Clingendael Report. – 2020. – P. 24.

A Royal Norwegian Air Force fighter leaves its shelter at Keflavík (2020) | nato.int

Denmark / Greenland. Another potential tension point in the Arctic region is Greenland, a region that has special significance due to being located between the US and Europe. In Greenland, interests of 3 actors clash: The US, China and Denmark. The US have a major military base in Greenland called Thule. It's used, among other purposes, to monitor the cosmos and for scientific studies of the Arctic space. Thule is the northernmost US air base; it is the most significant US air base in case of a potential military invasion through the Arctic space. Apart from hosting strategic bombers, the air base is valuable due to having missile defense and reconnaissance systems. China also has interests in Greenland: it actively invests in extraction of rare-earth metals. This is not welcomed by the Danish government; it believes the involvement of Chinese capital sabotages the Danish economic interests in the region[34].

34 Ibid. – P. 21-22.

Narsaq (Greenland), located near the Kvanefjeld deposit, rich in rare earth elements and uranium | Maggie & David, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

Norway / Svalbard. Norway is traditionally an object of great interest for various actors of the Arctic region due to its favorable conditions for energy-related and logistics-related projects. This is due to the fact that the Barents Sea is dominated by warm streams that make extraction of minerals and navigation easier. The Norwegian direction was seen as a key direction for the NSR Russian export of energy resources to the West in the winter months[35]. Now, Norway is considering possibilities of developing new gas fields due to the dramatic reduction in deliveries of Russian pipeline gas to the EU. The goal is to restore the energy balance and ensure supplies of raw materials to European countries. Norway is important to Russia from a strategic and military point of view, as the Barents Sea is split between the two countries. Tensions between Russia and Norway in the region are also connected with their disagreements on the issue of Svalbard[36], as well as China's long-term interests in the archipelago.

35 Ibid. – P. 24-25.

36 According to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, this is land territory of common use; today, it's the only such territory in the world. Also, Svalbard is a territorial unit of the Kingdom of Norway according to the Svalbard Act passed on 17 June 1925. The Russian Federation is the only signatory state to the Svalbard Treaty that has a general consulate in Svalbard. It's located in Barentsburg.

Barentsburg, Russian village on Svalbard | Rubeus Olivander / Shutterstock.com

Non-Arctic actors

Military and political landscape of the Arctic is becoming more and more complicated due to increased involvement of non-Arctic countries into Arctic projects. Increased potential of navigation in the Arctic due to climate change, as well as growing amount of available natural resources cause officially non-Arctic countries to get interested in the region.

China

China can be seen as the leader among such states. In 2018, it published a white paper on development of the Arctic, China's first document of this kind, that consisted of three main parts: 1) understanding the Arctic; 2) protecting the Arctic; 3) developing the Arctic.

The first part involves China financing various Arctic-related studies[37]. The scientific aspect is very important for China; it helps legitimize the Chinese presence in the politics of the Arctic. China has established two state-owned research bodies: The Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) and the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC). China owns two large research stations: in Svalbard and in Iceland.

"Understanding" of the Arctic is closely tied with the second direction of the Chinese Arctic policy: protection of the region, i.e. participating in climate research and protecting biodiversity and environmental stability. For example, China actively invests in Iceland's aquaculture projects. Scientific research allows China to participate in monitoring climate change and to contribute to monitoring the environment and prevention of various risks connected with thawing of ice and of permafrost.

37 Bowman L., Xu Q. China in the Arctic: Policies, strategies, and opportunities for Alaska // Fairbanks: Center for Arctic Policy Studies. – 2020.

The third direction is development of the Arctic that consists of increasing direct foreign investments in various Arctic projects. They include China's investments in extraction of rare-earth metals in Greenland, as well as financing of mining projects in Canada. In Russia, the main project that China participates in is Yamal LNG[38]; China owns 29.9% of its shares. Such projects help China meet the demand for raw materials necessary for the country's economic development in the long run. Chinese companies also own 20% of the Arctic LNG 2 project[39]; however, there have already been difficulties with shipping the Chinese equipment needed for the project[40].

In the white paper, China already announced its Polar Silk Road initiative that is also supposed to diversify sea trade routes and reduce shipment intervals for trade with Europe.

38 YAMAL LNG is an integrated project encompassing natural gas production, liquefaction and shipping. The project consists of construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant with an output capacity of around 16.5 million tons per year, using the South Tambey Field (located on the Yamal Peninsula) as a resource base.

39 ARCTIC LNG 2 is a project to build three liquefaction trains producing a total of 19.8 MTPA of LNG and up to 1.6 MTPA of SGC. The Arctic LNG 2 Project taps into resources of the Utrenneye field in the Gydan Peninsula (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug). It lies approximately 70 km away from the Yamal LNG project at the east shore of the Ob Bay.

40 A Chinese shipyard is ready to ship modules for the Arctic SPG 2 project // Neftegaz.ru. – 2022. – URL:https://neftegaz.ru/news/spg-szhizhennyy-prirodnyy-gaz/747195-kitayskaya-verf-gotova-otgruzit-moduli-dlya-proekta-arktik-spg-2-v-rossiyu/

Yamal LNG plant in Sabetta | novatek.ru

The interest in Arctic logistics is based on the fact that it can diversify foreign economic risks in the context of political instability in West Asia and other southern routes. To back up its ambitions, China is building an icebreaker fleet. Currently, the country has two functioning icebreaking vessels: Xue Long (Snow Dragon), a polar research vessel built at Kherson Shipyard in 1993, and Xue Long 2, which was built on a Chinese shipyard in 2019 and can be used for icebreaker escort of trade ships. The latter is significant for the implementation of the Polar Silk Road, since after acquiring its own Arctic fleet, China will no longer have to pay Russia for icebreaker escort. A third icebreaker, this time a nuclear-powered one, is also planned.[41] This is an issue of a more independent NSR navigation, which might potentially worsen future relations with Russia in the region[42]. China's own icebreakers will make the NSR more commercially attractive for those Chinese companies

41 Nilsen T. Details of China's nuclear-powered icebreaker revealed // The Barents Observer. – 2019. – URL: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2019/03/details-chinas-nuclear-powered-icebreaker-revealed

42 Laruelle M. Russia's Arctic policy: A power strategy and its limits. – 2020. – P. 21-22.

The Xue Long icebreaker carrying Chinese scientists during their sixth expedition to North Pole leaves a port in Shanghai (2014) | Imaginechina Limited / Alamy Stock Photo

that are not yet ready for full-scale Arctic trade because of higher safety standards for train shipments[43].

In general, China's policy is not concentrated on promoting its interests through the Arctic Council: China prefers to develop bilateral relations with particular partners concerning specific directions. This allows for more flexible policies, and China can thus increase its influence over small Arctic states[44].

It's interesting that the white paper describes China as a "Near-Arctic state", although this term has no legal foundation and is hardly obvious from the geographic point of view. However, it demonstrates that an Arctic identity is important for China, and that China is trying to play an active role in studying and development of the Arctic. Despite the fact that the white paper doesn't openly reference military and industrial matters, China has a very specific interpretation of the current international regulations of the Arctic; it accentuates the importance of cooperation. Here we can see China's wish to have more possibilities when it comes to participating in the issues regarding the Arctic, especially if we consider the Polar Silk Road project[45].

43 Zeng Q. et al. The competitiveness of Arctic shipping over Suez Canal and China-Europe railway // Transport Policy. – 2020. – Vol. 86. – P. 34-43.
44 Bowman L., Xu Q. China in the Arctic: Policies, strategies, and opportunities for Alaska // Fairbanks: Center for Arctic Policy Studies. – 2020. – P. 10.
45 Arctic Ambitions of the Land of the Red Dragon // RIAC. – 2018. – URL: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/arkticheskie-ambiczii-podnebesnoj/

The village of Ny-Alesund (Svalbard), where the research stations of Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, South Korea, India and China are located | Roger Goodwin / Alamy Stock Photo

Non-Arctic Asian countries: India, Japan, South Korea

India adopted a document on Arctic policy in the spring of 2022; however, it barely mentions military issues. For India, two directions are the key ones: environment and scientific study. India includes the so-called "third pole": the Himalayas. Thawing of the ice there can seriously affect the food security of the country. India sees the scientific direction as a way to understand the connection between climate change in the Arctic and in the Himalayas. India has several scientific objects in the Arctic. For example, the Himadri research station and the IndARC underwater observatory at Kongsfjorden, Svalbard.

From the geopolitical point of view, the presence of India is supposed to stop the Chinese influence from growing too big, and to create the situation when the pro-Indian International North–South Transport Corridor would compete with the Chinese concept of the Polar Silk Road. India is also interested in diversifying the import, hence it's ready to buy Russian hydrocarbons that are mined and transported through the NSR[46].

46 Suryanarayanan K. Third Pole's View on the North Pole - India's Arctic Policy // The Polar Connection. – 2022. – URL: https://polarconnection.org/third-pole-india-arctic-policy/

Re-deployment of the Ind-ARC mooring observatory in the Kongsfjorden waters
A shot from Rakesh Rao's film "The Climate Challenge"

The giant LNG carrier Arctic Voyager, manufactured by the Japanese company Kawasaki Heavy industries, loading at the Melkøya LNG processing facility in Hammerfest (Norway) | Jon Lord / Alamy Stock Photo

Apart from India, there is another country interested in Russian liquefied natural gas: **Japan.** It's located way closer to the NSR. Moreover, Japanese companies own 10% in the Russian Arctic LNG 2 project. Despite sanctions against Russia because of the war in Ukraine, Japan stated that is has no plans to leave the project[47], and it's planning to keep participating in Russian LNG projects Sakhalin-1[48] and Sakhalin-2[49].

The Japanese policy for the Arctic was adopted in 2015. The country has its own icebreaker used for scientific research; another icebreaker is being built. Generally, the NSR is one of the priorities in the Land of the Rising Sun's Arctic policy[50].

47 Japan is not considering suspending arctic LNG 2 project, industry min says // Reuters. – 2022. – URL: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/japan-is-not-considering-suspending-arctic-lng-2-project-industry-min-says-2022-03-30/

48 Sakhalin-1 is one of the largest offshore projects in Russia with foreign direct investments, implemented under the terms of Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs; came into force in 1996). The project envisages the development of three offshore fields — Chayvo, Odoptu and Arkutun-Dagi, located on the northeastern shelf of Sakhalin Island in the water area of the Sea of Okhotsk.

49 Sakhalin-2 is one of the world's largest oil and gas projects, for which a comprehensive energy infrastructure for the production, transportation and processing of hydrocarbons was built. It is operated by the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. The project's infrastructure includes three offshore ice-resistant platforms and a pipeline system.

50 Japan's Arctic Policy and the Northern Sea Route: Conflict between "Energy Security" and "Freedom of Navigation" // JFPF. – 2021. – URL: https://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/diplomacy/pt20210831150728114438.html

South Korea shares a similar Arctic policy. The country is also interested in diversifying its hydrocarbons imports. South Korea, like Japan, concentrates on increasing its import of liquefied natural gas through the Northern Sea Route. The country is also the world leader in building tankers: companies like Hyundai Heavy Industries, Samsung Heavy Industries and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Maritime Engineering (DSME) are the leaders in this branch, while two out of three of all the gas carriers currently in use were built in South Korea[51].

Unlike Japan, South Korea took a harder line against Russia after the beginning of the war in Ukraine. For example, South Korea refused to build LNG tankers for the Sovcomflot company (a joint venture with Novatek) as part of the Arctic LNG 2 project. The country's Arctic policy was adopted in 2013. It includes not only industrial interests, but also clauses on development of scientific cooperation in the Arctic, scientific projects and environmental studies. To this end, South Korea uses its Araon icebreaker.

Non-Arctic European countries: France, the United Kingdom, Germany[52]

France adopted its Arctic strategy valid through 2030. The date of the adoption is very recent: April 5, 2022, which is why the strategy mentions security issues connected with the war in Ukraine. In the strategy, France directly names Russia as a threat to Arctic stability and postulates reduction of cooperation with Russia. France pursues scientific goals as well as environmental ones that concern reduction of pollution and development of alternative energy sources[53].

51 South Korea // The Arctic Institute. – 2022. – URL: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/country-backgrounders/south-korea/

52 All three countries have observer status in the Arctic council.

53 Baudu P. Revitalizing France's Sight on the High North: Arctic Environmental and Security Elements of the New French Polar Strategy // The Arctic Institute. – 2022. – URL: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/revitalizing-france-sight-high-north-arctic-environmental-security-elements-new-french-polar-strategy/

The war in Ukraine also caused **the United Kingdom** to update its Arctic policy. In March 2022, the country adopted a new defense strategy for the region. This strategy underlines the UK's dedication to cooperating with NATO on Arctic issues; the need for military exercises (especially joint exercises with Norway on a regular basis) and for presence of the British fleet in the Arctic and defense of critical submarine infrastructure. Unlike France, the UK has no Arctic strategy as such, but it has a framework document on the country's policies in the region. Of all the non-Arctic European countries, the UK pays most attention to security issues.

Similar to the UK, **Germany** has no specific Arctic strategy; however, it adopted a document on basic policies in the region (2019). Germany's policies in the Arctic accentuate environmental issues, tightening of environmental requirements for Arctic projects (for example, banning the use of mazut fuel, as it

The Royal Navy Trafalgar class attack submarine HMS Tireless sits on the surface of the North Pole | Kevin Elliott, U.S. Navy

has already been done in the Antarctic), underlining the 'polluter pays' principle. However, after the war in Ukraine began, German Arctic policy experts are considering the need to increase Germany's cooperation with NATO in the region and accentuate the country's importance as a logistical base for NATO's naval forces[54].

The European Union

Since three of the member states of the Arctic Council are also members of the EU (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), the Union can also be seen as an actor in Arctic politics; especially if we consider the fact that Swedish and Finnish territories are partially located within the Arctic Circle. The role of the EU is also growing due to France's and Germany's promotion of their Arctic strategies; these countries aim to have bigger influence on risk management in the region. The EU has major influence on adoption and implementation of some of the international Arctic conventions, such as the Polar Code and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. Also, the EU can have an impact on the navigation rules of the countries that are part of the Union and, through environmental regulations, on natural resource extraction by companies within the EU jurisdiction. Another way the EU can influence the Arctic region is through various development programs that support social and economic projects in Finland and Sweden[55].

However, the fact that most Arctic countries are not EU members means that the Union hardly has a complex influence on the development of the Arctic. The EU norms directly apply only to Sweden and Finland

54 Germany in the Arctic-North Atlantic: Reassessing "Forgotten Waters," Part 2. – 2022. – URL: https://cimsec.org/germany-in-the-arctic-north-atlantic-reassessing-forgotten-waters-part-2/

55 Raspotnik A., Stępień A. The European Union and the Arctic: A decade into finding its Arcticness // Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic. – Springer, Cham, 2020. – P. 131-146.

(Greenland's status as a self-governing territory within Denmark doesn't imply direct authority), and partially to Norway and Iceland as members of the European Economic Area (excluding Svalbard). In other regards, the EU relies either on various bilateral formats of cooperation or on international UN agreements.

The EU frequently enhances its Arctic policies by improving its strategic documents (resolutions) to ensure stable development of the region. In 2021, the EU published a new strategy for main directions of Arctic policies. According to this strategic document, the European Union's main priorities in the region are: 1) environmental issues, reducing the carbon footprint in the Arctic; 2) monitoring the fulfillment of states' obligations within the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries; 3) investments in studies of thawing of permafrost. The EU also aims to obtain the observer status in the Arctic Council and to promote educational initiatives in the region[56].

NATO

It might seem strange, but NATO's strategic documents hardly ever mention the issue of security in the Arctic. Therefore it's too early to talk about a unified strategic NATO policy in the Arctic. However, the Trident Juncture military exercises in the Arctic are seen as NATO's contribution to regional security, although NATO is trying to find a balance between maintaining its military presence and engaging in a dialogue with Russia. This is viewed through the prism of the security dilemma, in which the sides are supposed to exchange information and warn each other of planned significant maneuvers (military exercises) in advance to avoid faulty assessments of security threats[57].

56 New EU Arctic Strategy // EEAS. – 2021. – URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/new-eu-arctic-strategy_en?s=177

57 Zandee D., Kruijver K., Stoetman A. Future of Arctic security // Clingendael Report. – 2020. – P. 40.

Exercise Trident Juncture 2018. Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 vessels escort amphibious task group in the Molde Fjords to conduct Amphibious Assault | NATO photo by WO FRAN C.Valverde (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

However, the beginning of the war in Ukraine led to rethinking NATO's role in the Arctic region. Russia's increasing military presence in the Arctic, as well as the expansion of Chinese interests in the region, raises the issue of integrating Arctic matters into NATO's strategic documents. Surprisingly enough, the term "Far North" was only mentioned in a NATO report in 2021 during a summit in Brussels. This is due to how complicated it is to develop a unified Arctic NATO policy, as various NATO members have a number of significant points they disagree on. For example, Canada is advocating for the region's demilitarization, while the US insists on increasing security measures in the Arctic. Meanwhile, Norway remains the leader of military and strategic activities in the region.

NATO analysts believe it's important to include the Arctic issues in strategic documents and even support partial return to some Cold War principles when it comes

to military presence in the Arctic[58]. Moreover, the US strategy in the Arctic region includes increasing the NATO involvement in ensuring security in the Arctic due to the war in Ukraine. Due to this, the US are planning to increase cooperation with their Arctic NATO allies, promote new military exercises, and increase security-related information exchange.

58 Buchanan E. Cool change ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North. – 2022. – URL: https://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=755

II.

RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC:

factors significant for energy and geopolitical dimensions; possibilities for transport and logistics; infrastructure limitations

The Arctic region is highly important for Russia from the points of both energy issues and geopolitics. The geopolitical significance of the Arctic is due to the fact that many military strategic objects are located there. For example, most of Russia's submarines with ballistic missile weapons are based near the Kola Peninsula.[59] The Northern Fleet group's unique status as a military district further showcases the Arctic's special role as Russia's geopolitical stronghold. The military district status was assigned to the Northern Fleet on January 1, 2021; the Fleet compiled of regions split off from the Western Military District: The Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Murmansk Oblast and The Nenets Autonomous Okrug[60].

The priority of security issues is also demonstrated by the fact that the basic normative legal act for the macroregion development's strategic planning (Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035) is stated as a document that outlines ways to ensure Russia's national security, compiled to protect Russia's national interests in the Arctic[61]. Moreover, the president issued a decree to adopt the Strategy of Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the Provision of National Security for the Period to 2035. This document identifies the exact measures to be used to achieve stated security goals. However, security is not seen in military terms, but in terms of quality of public administration and protection of the environment. Demographics, quality of life and infrastructure are mentioned as key parameters. Issues of military security are not mentioned in the document prior to the Article 19[62].

59 Rumer E., Sokolsky R., Stronski P. Russia in the Arctic: a critical view from the US // The Carnegie Moscow Center. – 2021. – URL: https://carnegiemoscow.org/2021/05/21/ru-pub-84584#_edn27

60 Russia's Northern Fleet has been granted a military district status // Interfax. – 2021. – URL: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/743819

61 The president of Russia's decree from 5 March 2020 N 164 "Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035" // IPO-Garant. – URL: https://base.garant.ru/73706526/

62 The president of Russia's decree from 26 October 2020 N 645 "Strategy of Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the Provision of National Security for the Period to 2035" IPO-Garant. – URL: https://base.garant.ru/74810556/#block_1000

The Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic is the organ that deals with military and political issues. The Commission was established in 2020[63]. It's headed by Dmitriy Medvedev, former president of Russia, currently Deputy Chairman of the Security Council. According to the provision on the commission[64], its functions include analyzing and predicting the future developments in the military and political situation; identifying domestic and foreign threats in the Arctic; dealing with issues of defense organization, mobilization readiness and Russia's military cooperation with foreign states in the region.

It's apparent that in the context of the unprecedented confrontation between today's Russia and the Western countries due to the war in Ukraine, and after Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO, the military and political rivalry in the Arctic will only be getting more severe. In particular, the decision by the Arctic Council countries to stop the Council's work for the period of 2021 to 2023 (the years of Russia's leadership) will only worsen the coordination on the Arctic issues between countries and will lead to promotion of national interests at the expense of international stability in the Arctic. For example, in July 2022 the Ministry of Defense of Russia announced tightening of regulation of international navigation in Russia's inland Arctic waters; Russia proposed making foreign government vessels ask for approval to use the Arctic waters no later than 90 days before entering the Russian EEZ. Previously, NSR navigation rules were only defined for commercial vessels[65].

The second factor of special significance to the Arctic is the issue of Russian energy security. The Arctic

63 The first session of the Security Council's Arctic Commission will take place soon // TASS. – 2020. – URL: https://tass.ru/politika/9287331

64 Provision on the Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic // Security Council of Russia. – URL: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/about/commission/MVK_ARC/

65 The Ministry of Defense has proposed changing the NSR navigation rules // RBK. – 2022. – URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/25/07/2022/62de9f5c9a7947f5812e7920

region accounts for 10% of the Russian GDP[66]; 80% of the Russian gas is extracted here; the rate is 17% for oil; 100% for diamonds (Alrosa, Yakutia), 90% for nickel and cobalt (Nornickel), about 60% for copper. Considering that Russia's supplies of energy resources to other countries generate about 2/3 of the country's export revenue and 1/3 of its federal budget revenue, it's obvious why Russia sees the Arctic as a highly significant region for its national security. Its biggest Arctic projects concern energy: Yamal LNG, Arctic LNG 2 (Novatek), Vostok Oil (Rosneft), Syradasai deposit (Arkticheskaya Gornaya Kompaniya) and several others.

Figure 2. Map of active and planned infrastructure projects in the Northern Sea Route waters



Source: Nuclear icebreaker fleet's role in development of the Northern Sea Route. – Presentation by FGUP Atomflot, the second Materials and Technologies for the Arctic international conference. – 2021. – URL: http://www.crism-prometey.ru/conferences/Arctech-2021/MTA-21-ATOMFLOT.pdf

66 Karaganov S. (lead author), Likhacheva A., Stepanov I., Suslov V. et al. Russia's arctic policy: international aspects: report for the XXII April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development // Higher School of Economics – 2021. – P. 21. – URL: https://conf.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/465307123.pdf

However, Russia is aiming to increase its resource base even further; it's especially enthusiastic when it comes to expanding its continental shelf. Back in 2001, Russia submitted its first application, in which it provided the foundation for its claims to Mendeleev and Lomonosov ridges. The provided information was deemed insufficient, and Russia began gathering data that would further justify its territorial claims. To this end, in 2007 Russia became the first country whose expedition group dived to the Arctic Ocean's floor at the North Pole (depth: more than 4000 meters) to study the deep water area of the Arctic. In 2015, the second, amended application was submitted. Currently, Russia keeps presenting additional data to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in order to have new territories accepted as belonging to Russia[67].

67 Russian claims on parts of the Arctic shelf. Dossier // TASS. – 2016. – URL: https://tass.ru/info/2649335

Research vessel Akademik Fedorov, which reached the North Pole in 2007 to confirm Russia's rights to the Lomonosov Ridge | Alexey Shmatkov / Photobank Lori

In 2019, a subcommittee provisionally recognized that 1.2 million square kilometers of the shelf beyond EEZ are part of the Russian continental shelf. However, no final decision has been made yet; technicalities are still being worked on[68]. Considering current international tensions, the process might drag on even longer, especially considering that Canada and Denmark have their own claims to the shelf. Russia has some experience of successfully increasing its shelf: in 2013, an application was submitted for a 50-thousand square kilometers shelf section in the Sea of Okhotsk; in just a year, it was recognized as belonging to Russia. However, that application was approved in March 2014, before a new escalation of tensions between Russia and the West: most likely, it happened due to the inertia factor, as the decision had already been made before the Crimean crisis. Besides, there were no other countries claiming that part of the shelf in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Decreasing western purchases of Russian oil and gas significantly increase Russia's interest in exporting raw materials to Asia. Increase of such exports fulfills several goals: 1) diversifying export flows and lowering the dependence on western countries and their policies; 2) increasing profitability of Arctic projects whose payback depends on the demand for raw materials in Asia; 3) attracting investments from Asian countries (chiefly China and India) into the Arctic raw materials sector; without this, it's impossible to develop projects in the absence of critical technologies of your own. For example, 70% of the equipment for the Yamal LNG project is made in China, as well as vessels that deliver liquefied gas[69].

68 Rosnedra announced the UN support for Russia's claims for the Arctic shelf // RBK. – 2019. – URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/03/04/2019/5ca4706e9a794766825ee680

69 Karaganov S. (lead author), Likhacheva A., Stepanov I., Suslov V. et al. Russia's arctic policy: international aspects: report for the XXII April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development // Higher School of Economics. – 2021. – C. 34. – URL: https://conf.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/465307123.pdf

Two modules for Yamal LNG made in China on their way to Russia | ChinaImages

Within the context of the current large-scale sanctions against Russia, the success of Arctic projects is even more dependent on foreign political conditions. Previously, an exchange model was used (access to deposits in exchange for technologies and investments); now, such approach to developing energy-related projects is only possible in cooperation with Asian countries. Although this might also fail if the mechanism of secondary sanctions is going to work and limit Russian cooperation with its Asian partners. Especially since the Asian market can't fully replace Western technologies and raw material purchasers, considering gradual switching to "green" energy sources that will limit long-term perspectives of any raw material-related projects. A little while ago, Western companies were ready to agree to co-invest in projects with limited profitability to compete with Asian giants. Now, Russia doesn't have its usual leverage to attract both European and American technologies because of sanctions and because of the West trying to lower the consumption of traditional hydrocarbons[70].

70 Keil K. The Arctic in a global energy picture: international determinants of Arctic oil and gas development // Governing Arctic Change. – Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017. – P. 289-292.

Another advantage that Russia has in the Arctic is access to seawaters of the region that are more convenient for navigation than any others. Right now, the NSR has the longest navigation period, especially in the summer[71]. The NSR's amount of shipped goods grows gradually: in 2014, it was 4 million tons; in 2021, it was 33.5 million tons. However, this is still far from the target goal of 80 million tons that is supposed to be achieved by 2024 according to the May Decrees[72]. One of the problems is a very small share of transit traffic using the NSR not as an interregional route to ship goods, but as an alternative sea route for international shipping; such shipments only constituted 2.3 million tons in 2021[73], which is about 7% of the shipping.

There is still the problem of insufficiently developed navigation infrastructure and weather forecasting, which led to the so-called 'Pevek crisis' in November 2021. Back then, wrong forecast of ice conditions and an attempt by some shipowners to pass the sea route without paying for the assistance of icebreakers led to more than 20 ships getting stuck in the east of NSR[74]. That jam led to the transfer of rights to control navigation on the NSR from the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation (Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transportation) to the Rosatom state corporation. A new structure was established: Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput)[75].

Another problem is insufficient icebreaker fleet. Half of the icebreakers operational today were built during the

71 Stephenson S. R. et al. Projected 21st-century changes to Arctic marine access // Climatic Change. – 2013. – Vol. 118. – №. 3. – P. 893.

72 President of Russia's Executive Order On National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Russian Federation through to 2024, May 7, 2018.

73 Northern Sea Route freight traffic has broken a new record // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. – 2022. – URL: https://rg.ru/2022/01/18/reg-szfo/perevozki-po-severnomu-morskomu-puti-pobili-novyj-rekord.html

74 Smertina P., Skorlygina N. Northern Sea Crossroads // Kommersant – 2022. – URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5171578

75 Rosatom will create a Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route // TASS. – 2022. – URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/14917063

Soviet times. Due to this, Dmitriy Medvedev, head of the Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Arctic Committee, predicts lack of icebreaking capabilities by 2030 unless fleet renovation projects are implemented[76].

Another limiting factor is lack of resources to implement major infrastructure projects, including those that would impact the NSR cargo turnover growth. In mid-November 2022, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Marat Khusnullin announced suspension of the Northern Latitudinal Railway (NLR) construction project. NLR was supposed to be a railroad that would connect the cities of Labytnangi and Novy Urengoy through Salekhard. The government decided to concentrate on building the Eastern Polygon, expanding the Baikal–Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian Railway[77].

Melting of Arctic ice not only provides Russia with transport and resource-related opportunities, but also carries in itself major risks that result from thawing of permafrost. Due to high level of development of the north since the Soviet times, many buildings located in Arctic cities and work settlements stand on ice-rich soil. It is also known that during the Soviet times temperature regulations that engineers used were based on retrospective average annual temperature data, and the permissible variation coefficient was merely 1.65. In the US, for example, such coefficients are from 2.5 to 3. It means that most Soviet infrastructure projects don't fully account for the new temperature realities, which creates risks of industrial accidents[78]. It has been estimated that Novy Port (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), Anadyr (Chukotka) and Yakutsk (Sakha Republic) will be the cities with the biggest reduction in bearing capacities of foundations.

76 Medvedev: By 2030, Russia might face the deficit of icebreakers unless the fleet is updated // TASS. – 2022. – URL: https://tass.ru/politika/16367341

77 Khusnullin announced suspension of railroad project in Yamal // RBK. – 2022. – URL: https://www.rbc.ru/business/15/11/2022/63739cfd9a7947ee43bd817e

78 Romanovsky V. et al. SWIPA Update Chapter 3 Changing Permafrost and its Impacts. P. 55-66.

Figure 3. A decade of changes in bearing capacities of foundations due to thawing of permafrost (in percent)



Source: Romanovsky V. et al. SWIPA Update Chapter 3 Changing Permafrost and its Impacts. P. 60

According to the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic, about 70% of the Arctic infrastructure is at risk of man-made disasters due to thawing of permafrost. 45% of the region's oil and gas infrastructure is also at risk[79]. Prevention of various accidents due to thawing mostly depends on large-scale scientific studies and monitoring activities. However, essential international cooperation and information exchange with other countries that face similar risks (like Canada) have been temporarily stopped due to the war in Ukraine[80].

To round up this section, we can see that Arctic territories have major significance for Russia. In the

79 How thawing of permafrost is threatening the Russians living in the Arctic zone // Kedr. – 2022. – URL: https://kedr.media/stories/nevechnaya-1702

80 Yefremova A. Melting perspectives. Fighting in Ukraine put an end to international scientific cooperation on the Arctic // Kedr. – 2022. – URL: https://kedr.media/research/tayushhie-perspektivy-2586

Destruction of freshwater supply lines in Svalbard due to melting permafrost, 2008 | Blickwinkel / Alamy Stock Photo

last several years, the government, the president, and other state actors have been in favor of regulating the activities in the Arctic. For example, in 2020 the president adopted the Strategy of Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and the Provision of National Security for the Period to 2035; in it, the Russian government is named as the main implementer. Also, a state program for socioeconomic development of the Russian Arctic zone was created. Its implementation is a duty of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic. The program showcases the state's increased interest towards the Arctic: "The Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is a geostrategic territory that has key significance for maintaining Russian national interests and national security in the Arctic". Who, apart from the president, the government and its relevant ministry, has key influence on decision-making in the region? We'll try to answer this question in the next chapters of this study.

III.

KEY STAKEHOLDERS OF THE ARCTIC POLITICS

Methodology and sampling

Methodology and sampling developed by the experts at the Arctida project are the basis of this study. For this study, data on 828 personalities connected with the Arctic region of Russia was gathered and reviewed[81].

We split the people who make and influence decisions in the region into 6 groups:

1) persons in legislative bodies, or in institutional structures reporting to them;

2) persons in executive bodies, or in institutional structures reporting to them;

3) members of business associations or of management bodies of a head commercial structure that has representation in the Arctic region;

4) persons who belong to expert organizations and structures whose chief activities are aimed at making decisions concerning the Arctic region;

5) persons in national security agencies;

6) persons who represent regional Russian interests in international and supranational bodies.

For the list of organizations that belong to aforementioned influence groups, see Appendix 1.

Several limitations in the study's methodology should be mentioned.

81 The Arctic zone includes territories of nine Russian regions (Murmansk Oblast, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, as well as parts of the Komi Republic, the Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Sakha, Krasnoyarsk Krai and Arkhangelsk Oblast).

Firstly, the study sample only includes the commercial companies who have access to targeted investments in the region and whose top management is represented in expert bodies of state, legislative and other power structures of the Arctic region.

Secondly, one person can belong to several assessment blocks, which would increase their power.

Thirdly, representatives of federal law enforcement agencies are excluded from the study, as they're difficult to identify: there's little publicly available data on them, and their "informal" connections would have to be confirmed via expert interviews. As matters of national security are a duty of several law enforcement agencies, their representation in politics of the Arctic is dispersed. To solve this problem, we addressed the only body that formally bridges the gap in implementation of national security policies in the Arctic: the Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic. The Commission includes stakeholders from law enforcement agencies that possess major influence in the Arctic region.

Fourthly, not all the stakeholders from the PORA (Project Office for Arctic Development) expert council were included in the final study sample. As this organization accepts members in a declarative manner, it includes many persons who have no influence on the politics in the region. The final PORA sample didn't include students, teachers, experts whose work is not connected with the regional agenda, as well as owners of small businesses.

Fifthly, the study sample does not include such federal executive bodies and consultative bodies at them as the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet) and the supervisory board for coordination of the activities of Russian Scientific Center on Spitsbergen (RSCS).

These bodies were not included in the study sample to avoid the risks of endogeneity or regenerative connection, since some of the stakeholders from the executive bodies have already been included in the study, and their affiliations with the executive bodies have already been established. Inclusion of such coordinating or consultative bodies in the study sample could undermine the validity of the estimated «power» of Arctic actors and increase it artificially.

Finally, the study sample does not include the stakeholders who are involved in Arctic policies as part of their core activities. For example, VEB was not considered, as it is a development institution which is by default involved in financial support of all kinds of projects in Russia, not just the ones in the Arctic zone. The same is true for RZD: the state-owned railway monopoly will evidently be involved in any projects where delivery of railroad infrastructure is required. In other words, the methodology of this research was aimed at identification of the stakeholders who have access to unique levers of influence over Arctic issues that are sometimes outside the scope of their offices and positions. This avoids overcoverage in sampling that would have led to reduction of this study to a reconstruction of the chain of command in Russia in general without the focus on special cases of influence on Arctic policies. At the same time, we specifically studied those actors who are uniquely placed to influence Arctic policies in particular. Rosatom is an example: in 2022, by order of the government in addition to the mandate of the infrastructure operator, this state corporation was empowered to control navigation on the Northern Sea Route. To implement this decision, Rosatom established the Federal State Budgetary Institution Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route. Previously navigation on the Northern Sea Route was managed by the Ministry of Transport.

The data in the study is relevant for the period from January to August 2022.

How affiliation data was gathered

To exclude non-relevant affiliations from the study, we limited the data on stakeholders' connections that was used. Organizations and/or positions of reviewed stakeholders were included in the affiliations sections if they were connected with:

a) a federal decision making center;

b) a regional decision making center;

c) a body/organization relevant to the Arctic (research institutes, regional businesses, non-profit organizations whose work is related to the Arctic, etc.).

Other than that, only the stakeholders' affiliations relevant at the time of data gathering were sampled, i.e. without considering their past (except for several stakeholders who have the biggest influence on the region).

Key influence groups and stakeholders in the Arctic

Among 828 sampled stakeholders, 85 (10.3%) are the persons most relevant to the study. Each one of them belongs to at least two influence groups.

The rest of the persons belong to only one influence group (89.7%); such stakeholders have the least significance in decision making, and the lowest networking level.

The most influential persons sampled are 20 stakeholders who belong to no less than three structures connected with Arctic issues.

Figure 4.
Intersections of stakeholders in influence groups



Jamen Percy

They can be split into several categories:

1. Representatives of federal ministries who are involved in work of consultative bodies on Arctic development:
    - **Aleksey Olegovich Chekunkov,** Russian Minister of Development of the Far East and the Arctic
    - **Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kozlov,** Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia, former Russian Minister for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic
    - **Aleksey Sergeyevich Besprozvannykh,** Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of Russia
    - **Sergey Sergeyevich Galkin,** head of the Federal State Statistics Service, former Deputy Minister of Economic Development of Russia
    - **Leonid Vladimirovich Gornin,** First Deputy Finance Minister of Russia
2. Members of parliament involved in work of relevant committees or councils for Arctic development:
    - **Artur Nikolayevich Chilingarov,** member of the 8th State Duma, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, president of State Polar Academy, Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Russian Federation, the most famous Arctic explorer in Russia
    - **Grigoriy Petrovich Ledkov,** member of the Federation Council of Russia from the legislative body of state power of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug
    - **Aleksandr Konstantinovich Akimov,** member of the Federation Council of Russia from the legislative body of state power of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)

3. Representatives of some of the biggest Russian businesses and state corporations:
    - **Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Ruksha,** Deputy CEO of the Rosatom state corporation, Director for the Northern Sea Route Directorate
    - **Andrey Mikhailovich Grachev,** Vice President of Norilsk Nickel for Federal and Regional Programs
    - **Denis Borisovich Solovyev,** Deputy Chairman of the Management Board at Novatek
4. Rectors of higher education institutions located in the Arctic:
    - **Elena Vladimirovna Kudryashova,** rector of Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov
    - **Anatoliy Nikolayevich Nikolayev,** rector of the Ammosov North-Eastern Federal University
5. Governors of Russian regions whose territories are part of the Arctic zone:
    - **Yuriy Vasilyevich Bezdudnyy,** Governor of Nenets Autonomous Okrug
    - **Dmitriy Andreyevich Artyukhov,** Governor of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug
    - **Artur Olegovich Parfenchikov,** Head of the Republic of Karelia
    - **Vladimir Viktorovich Uyba,** Head of the Komi Republic
    - **Aleksandr Vitalyevich Tsybulskiy,** Governor of Arkhangelsk Oblast
6. Representative of the president:
    - **Yuriy Petrovich Trutnev,** Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District

Table 1.
Top 20 key stakeholders of the Arctic politics

No.	Stakeholder	Executive bodies	Legislative bodies	Business structures	Expert bodies	Security agencies	Intergovernmental organizations
1	Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Ruksha	●	●	●	●	●	
2-7	Aleksey Olegovich Chekunkov	●	●	●		●	
2-7	Andrey Vladimirovich Chibis	●	●		●		●
2-7	Elena Vladimirovna Kudryashova	●	●	●	●		
2-7	Anatoliy Nikolayevich Nikolayev	●	●	●	●		
2-7	Yuriy Petrovich Trutnev	●		●	●	●	
2-7	Artur Nikolayevich Chilingarov	●	●		●	●	
8-20	Yuriy Vasilyevich Bezdudnyy	●			●		●
8-20	Grigoriy Petrovich Ledkov	●	●	●			
8-20	Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kozlov	●	●			●	
8-20	Andrey Mikhailovich Grachev		●	●	●		
8-20	Dmitriy Andreyevich Artyukhov	●	●		●		
8-20	Artur Olegovich Parfenchikov	●			●	●	
8-20	Vladimir Viktorovich Uyba	●			●	●	
8-20	Aleksandr Vitalyevich Tsybulskiy	●			●	●	
8-20	Aleksandr Konstantinovich Akimov	●	●		●		
8-20	Aleksey Sergeyevich Besprozvannykh	●	●		●		
8-20	Sergey Sergeyevich Galkin	●	●		●		
8-20	Leonid Vladimirovich Gornin	●	●		●		
8-20	Denis Borisovich Solovyev		●	●	●		

From the institutional point of view, stakeholders with most connections (i.e. members of various Arctic development structures) work in federal executive bodies, the Russian parliament (the State Duma and the Federation Council), Arctic flagship universities, state corporations (Rosatom), and are heads (governors) of Russian regions; governors who are most actively involved in work of various councils and consultative bodies on Arctic matters are in most cases heads of the regions that are part of the Northwestern Federal District. It can be said that the aforementioned structures can play the role of grounds for coordination of interests concerning Arctic development. Later, we will review the degrees of representation of groups of stakeholders, and of their influence on the Arctic politics.

An important phenomenon that was confirmed while we were analyzing the stakeholders is that the institution of presidency plays a defining role in the development of the Arctic. The analysis has demonstrated that **Yuriy Petrovich Trutnev** and **Artur Nikolayevich Chilingarov** are among the stakeholders best represented in the Arctic structures.

Trutnev represents the institution of presidency in the government (executive branch): he is Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy[82] to the Far Eastern Federal District. As presidential envoy, Trutnev is subordinate to the president and is accountable before him. It means that key decisions on the Arctic and the Far East are part of the president of Russia's sphere of interest, and are controlled by him[83].

82 The official who represents the president of Russia within the relevant federal district. Presidential envoy ensures implementation of constitutional powers of the head of state within a relevant federal district; he is a federal public official and is part of the Presidential Administration of Russia. – URL: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102065756

83 For example, Putin held a meeting on the development of the Arctic; Trutnev was the main speaker. – URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68188

Chilingarov, other than being a State Duma member, is also the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic. He became a special representative in October 2005. Back then, he was a special representative for the International Polar Year. In December 2008, Chilingarov was assigned to his current position by president Medvedev, and later, in 2012, by Putin. It's important that Chilingarov, being a special representative, is not part of the Presidential Administration because the Regulations on the Administration of the President don't mention a special representative for international cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic. Despite this, the name of Chilingarov's position references the interests of the president in the Arctic region. In practice, it's difficult to check Chilingarov's degree of participation in forming the Arctic agenda. First, he has almost never voted on parliamentary bills since the beginning of 2022. Second, he has shown minimal activity at introducing bills into the State Duma during its two recent convocations (only 14 bills had him among initiators), and his bills have mostly been concentrated on such topics as regulating mass media and punishment for subversive activities. Only one bill in the last six years involved regional politics and issues related to the North and the Far East. It means that Chilingarov belongs to 4 groups out of 6 due to formal reasons, not because he's actively promoting Arctic development nowadays.

In summary, two key stakeholders from two different branches of power, executive and legislative, represent the interests of the president to various degrees. However, due to Chilingarov's low level of activity we're only going to concentrate on **Yuriy Petrovich Trutnev** as a key actor representing the interests of the president in the Arctic politics.

Yuriy Petrovich
TRUTNEV

Deputy Prime Minister
of Russia and Presidential Envoy
to the Far Eastern Federal District

Representation:

- Executive bodies
- Security agencies
- Business structures
- Expert bodies

Organizations:

- State Commission for Arctic Development
- Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic
- FSUE Atomflot and Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation
- International Arctic Forum Organizing Committee

Affiliations:

- Head of the Governmental Commission on Ensuring Russian Presence on Svalbard
- Head of the Governmental Commission on Socioeconomic Development of Far East
- Head of the Governmental Commission on Emergency Mitigation in Far East
- Member of the State Council of Russia
- Member of the Security Council of Russia

- Member of the Bureau of the Supreme Council, and of the Supreme Council of the United Russia party
- Member of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects, as well as its Presidium
- Chairman of the board of PAO RusHydro
- Member of the Far Eastern Federal University's supervisory board

Biography:

Born on March 1, 1956. Graduated the Perm Polytechnic University in 1978. Started his career in NGDU Polaznaneft, Komineft, PermNIPIneft (until 1981). Then, from 1981 to 1988, he worked in city and regional committees of Komsomol and the regional sports committee. In 1990, he returned to the commercial sector: as CEO of EKS LIMITED and as the president of AO E.K.S. International (starting 1996). At the same time, he was, starting 1994, head of the committee for economic policy and taxation of the local Legislative Assembly and member of the Perm City Duma. From 1996 to 2000, he was the head of the Perm city. From 2000 to 2004, he was the governor of Perm Oblast. From 2004 to 2012, he was the Russian Minister of Natural Resources. In 2012-2013, he was an Aide to the President of Russia. Starting 2013, he has been a Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and the Presidential Envoy to the Far East Federal District.

Summary:

Trutnev occupies leading positions both in the federal executive branch (Deputy Prime Minister) and in the Presidential Administration (Envoy). It's Trutnev who oversees all the state programs related to the Arctic development, and heads the State Commission for

Arctic Development. Trutnev is also deputy head of the Security Council of Russia's Arctic Committee. It should be noted that, one way or another, all Arctic and Far East development ministers have been subordinates of Trutnev: Aleksandr Kozlov (current Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology), as well as Aleksey Chekunkov, the current head of the ministry. **Trutnev is the highest-ranking stakeholder** on the list of those who belong to several influence groups of the Arctic region at once (4 out of 6 groups).

Later, we will review intersections between stakeholders from six studied influence groups, and we will highlight the most significant personalities in each one of them.

Icebreaker Ural at the berth of the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg (2022) | Alekc2m (CC-BY-SA-4.0)

Figure 5.
Intersections of stakeholders from different groups of influence

828 total stakeholders in six influence groups



223 Members of business structures **(26.9 %)**

106 Members of legislative bodies **(12.8 %)**

141 Members of executive bodies **(17.0 %)**

18 Members of intergovernmental organizations **(2.2 %)**

30 Members of security agencies **(3.6 %)**

423 Members of expert organizations **(51.1 %)**

Executive bodies

Stakeholders from **executive bodies** have the most representation on other Arctic-related platforms: **37.6%** of persons from the executive branch belong to other influence groups. A significant number of persons from the executive branch are also members of legislative bodies and expert organizations.

Figure 6.
Stakeholders from executive bodies in other influence groups



Executive branch stakeholders with most power belong to the **Council to Develop Far East, Arctic and Antarctic at the Federation Council** (influence group: the legislative branch) and the **International Arctic Forum Organizing Committee** (influence group: expert bodies).

Such level of representation of the executive branch in these bodies might be due to the fact that the Council includes governors, ministers or their deputies. The International Arctic Forum Organizing Committee also mostly consists of representatives of ministries and heads of Arctic region subjects. This lineup of the Forum can be explained by the fact that it is supported by the State Commission for Arctic Development, and the president of Russia.

We would like to highlight three people from the executive branch that didn't make it to the list of top 20 most influential stakeholders, but who are important to understand the context of how Arctic government bodies are formed. It's **Gadzhimagomed Gadzhibuttayevich Guseynov,** First Deputy Minister of Development of the Far East and the Arctic, two influence groups; **Grigoriy Viktorovich Smolyak,** Director of the Social Development Department of the Far East and the Arctic, two influence groups; **Soslan Ruslanovich Abisalov,** Director of the Infrastructure Development Department of the Russian Ministry for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, one influence group. They are interesting due to the fact that they are classical "technocrats" who built their career by doing civil service. It's notable that Abisalov and Guseinov only started working at the Ministry recently, in 2021; before that, they were dealing with North Caucasus issues. This reflects the priority given by the state to people with experience of managing strategic territories as such rather than to specialists in the Far East or the Arctic in particular.

We will consider now the most influential person from the executive branch influence group: **Aleksey Olegovich Chekunkov**.

Aleksey Olegovich CHEKUNKOV

Russian Minister
of Development of the Far East
and the Arctic

Representation:

- Executive bodies
- Legislative bodies
- Security agencies
- Business structures

Organizations:

- Russian Ministry for Development of the Far East and the Arctic
- State Commission for Arctic Development
- Council to Develop the Far East, the Arctic and the Antarctic at the Federation Council
- AO Korporatsiya Razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka i Arktiki
- Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic

Affiliations:

- Member of the board of RusHydro

Biography:

Born on 3 October, 1980 in Minsk (Belarus). Chekunkov comes from a family of diplomats: his father was Belarusian ambassador extraordinary to Vietnam (1998-2001) and worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Belarus. Chekunkov himself spent his younger years in Paris; then he moved to Moscow, where he graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 2001. He started his career in the Alrosa investment group. He was a director of projects in that company (2002-2003). After this, he started managing investments at Delta Private Equity[84]. There, he met Kirill Dmitriyev, today the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF). After this, Chekunkov became the managing director of Obedinennaya Zolotaya Kompaniya (2006-2009), a company overseen by Alfa Group. At that time, Chekunkov dealt with investment in many parts of the world, including Indonesia. He interacted with Mikhail Fridman, a founder of the Alfa Group. Later, Chekunkov decided to start his own investment company New Nations Capital, which he headed from 2009 to 2011. Then, the present-day minister helped his acquaintance Kirill Dmitriyev create RDIF; in it, he was responsible for the Russia-China Investment Fund project. In the Fund, Chekunkov was the director and a member of the board. In 2013, he left RDIF and created a new investment company called PAMIR (Pacific Asia, Mideast, India, Russia) that specialized in attracting Asian capital. In 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Trutnev invited[85] Chekunkov to head AO Fond Razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka i Arktiki (2014-2020). This legal entity was created in 2011; its stated goal was to support infrastructure and industrial projects in the Far Eastern macroregion and in the Arctic. Currently, the company implementing this goal is AO Korporatsiya Razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka i Arktiki.

84 A department of The US Russia Investment Fund, created by the US government for private investments in the Russian economy, was operational in 1995–2008, after which its duties were transferred to the U.S. Russia Foundation (USRF). In 2015, USRF was included in the list of foreign and international non-profit organizations declared undesirable in Russia).

85 Nekhaychuk Y. “Right now, we have to go through geopolitical withdrawals” // Vedomosti – 2015. – URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/characters/2015/09/01/606987-u-nas-seichas-est-poslednii-shans-na-proriv

Russian Minister of Development of the Far East and the Arctic Aleksey Chekunkov and Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Yuriy Trutnev | kremlin.ru

Chekunkov is chairman of the board of that company. The company's activities are aimed at using mechanisms of state support for investment projects. According to Chekunkov, his dream was to work with Trutnev, as they both love Eastern martial arts (Trutnev is the president of the Russian Kyokushin Association). After Mikhail Mishustin became the prime minister of Russia, Aleksey Chekunkov was appointed Minister for Development of the Far East and the Arctic.

Summary:

Aleksey Chekunkov belongs to 4 influence groups out of 6, he has experience working in leading positions in companies that are directly or indirectly connected with the Arctic region. Other than that, Chekunkov is a member of the Council to Develop the Far East, the Arctic and the Antarctic at the Federation Council and of Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic. This makes him even more influential than as solely the relevant minister and **makes the decision-making process in the Arctic more centralized**.

Legislative bodies

The second most represented group of stakeholders are members of the **legislative branch**: **30.2%** of persons belong to other influence groups. Most persons from the legislative branch intersect with executive bodies, particularly with the **State Commission for Arctic Development**.

Figure 7.
Stakeholders from legislative bodies in other influence groups



We can see the interdependence shown in the executive branch representation section: persons from the executive section (governors, representatives of ministries) belong to consultative bodies of the legislative branch, but they're also equally represented in their own (executive) section.

Due to this, we can state that **there is a very high degree of interaction between two branches of power**: legislative and executive. The persons from these groups make joint decisions that have the biggest influence on the Arctic region's development agenda.

Grigoriy Petrovich Ledkov is one of the influential stakeholders in this influence group.

Grigoriy Petrovich LEDKOV

Member
of the Federation Council
of Russia from the legislative body
of state power
of Yamalo-Nenets
Autonomous Okrug

Representation:

- Executive bodies
- Legislative bodies
- Business structures

Organizations:

- Public Council of the Arctic zone
- Council of the Federation Committee on the Federal Structure, Regional Policies, Local Self-Governance and Affairs of the North
- Council to Develop the Far East, the Arctic and the Antarctic at the Federation Council
- Arctic Economic Council

Affiliations:

- President of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North
- Member of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations
- Member of the Public Council under the Department of Internal Policy of Nenets Autonomous Okrug

Biography:

Born on March 26, 1969 in Naryan-Mar, Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Ledkov is an ethnic Nenets. He graduated from the Naryan-Mar Veterinary College in 1988, the Herzen University in 1996, and the Saint Petersburg State University in 2006. From 2000 to 2008, he held various positions in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug's various municipal self-government bodies. In 2010-2011, he was the vice-chairman of the District Duma of the Municipal Formation Tazovsky District (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug). From 2011 to 2020, he was State Duma deputy (ran for the United Russia party), was member of the party faction for both convocations. Starting from 2020, he has been a member of the Federation Council of Russia from the legislative body of state power of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Member of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations.

Summary:

Grigoriy Ledkov is one of the most influential personalities working in the Arctic region's legislative bodies. According to the study of lobbying in the Federation Council, Ledkov as a senator represents regional and sectoral (forestry, fishing) interests.

As a Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug senator and a Nenets, he promotes legislative initiatives that benefit small-numbered peoples of Russia on the federal level. Starting from 2013, Ledkov has been heading the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East. As part of the Arctic Economic Council, Ledkov promotes the agenda of the Association rather than interests of a particular business enterprise. As the goals of the Arctic Economic Council are exchange of experience and representation of enterprises working in the Arctic, we included Ledkov in the business structures interest group. As we can see, Grigoriy Ledkov is one of the few who represent regional interests of an Arctic federal subject: Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

Holiday of the Reindeer Breeder, Nadym city, Yamal region, Russia | Grigory Pisotsky / Photobank Lori

Business structures

Business structures stakeholders are represented in other influence groups twice as little as executive or legislative personalities: **18.4%** of stakeholders belong to other influence groups.

Figure 8.
Stakeholders from business structures in other influence groups



Among the top 20 key stakeholders, despite a relatively low percentage of personalities from business structures being represented, at least 7 of them belong to the business interest group. Two of those personalities belong to management bodies of Rosatom (including its subsidiary FSUE Atomflot),

while management bodies of AO Korporatsiya Razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka i Arktiki, Norilsk Nickel and Novatek include one stakeholder from the top list each. Two more persons belong to associations/ councils connected with business: International Scientific, Technological, Business and Educational Partnership “Stable Development of the Russian Arctic Zone” and the Arctic Economic Council.

Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Ruksha is the most interesting person in this influence group.

Vyacheslav Vladimirovich RUKSHA

Deputy CEO of the Rosatom state corporation,
Director for the Northern Sea Route Directorate

Representation:

- Executive bodies
- Legislative bodies
- Security agencies
- Business structures
- Expert bodies

Organizations:

- State Commission for Arctic Development
- Council to Develop the Far East, the Arctic and the Antarctic at the Federation Council
- Security Council of Russia’s Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic

- FSUE Atomflot and Rosatom
- International Arctic Forum Organizing Committee

Affiliations:

- Member of the board of JSC United Shipbuilding Corporation
- Member of the Council of the Association of Polar Explorers

Biography:

Born on February 17, 1954. In 1976, he graduated from the Leningrad Order of Lenin and the Order of the October Revolution Higher Maritime Engineering School named after S.O. Makarov. Ruksha held the following positions: CEO of OAO Murmanskoye Morskoye Parokhodstvo (1998-2000); first deputy Minister of Transport of Russia (2000-2004); head of the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transportation (2004-2005); adviser to the president of Russian Railways (2005-2008). He has been working for the Rosatom state corporation almost since its inception in 2008.

On 24 July 2018, he was appointed Deputy Director General, Director of the Northern Sea Route Directorate of Rosatom state corporation.

Summary:

Analysis of the stakeholders revealed the fact that Vyacheslav Ruksha is the most influential stakeholder in the Arctic region: he’s the only person to belong to 5 out of 6 groups. Ruksha has a wide Arctic background, having held leading positions in OAO Murmanskoye Parokhodstvo and the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transportation;

Nuclear-powered lighter carrier Sevmorput (“Northern Sea Route”) being unloaded in the port of Kamchatka | A. A. Piragis / Lori Photobank

currently he’s the head of one of Rosatom’s most important infrastructure projects in the Arctic: the Northern Sea Route. Rosatom is planning to invest 1,457 billion rubles (about 21 billion dollars) in NSR’s development; the money is going to be allocated from the federal budget and extra-budgetary funds. Other than his Rosatom position, Vyacheslav Ruksha is member of the JSC United Shipbuilding Corporation’s board of directors; this company is also interested in promoting its interests in the Arctic. JSC United Shipbuilding Corporation designs and builds icebreakers and special purpose ships, as well as vessels and sea equipment for shelf development, etc.

Expert bodies

Expert organizations are the least represented among the most populous groups: **11.6%** of stakeholders from these organizations belong to other influence groups. Stakeholders from this section are most frequently represented in executive branch and business structures influence groups.

Figure 9.
Stakeholders from expert bodies in other influence groups



The executive aspect is connected with the aforementioned participation of governors and representatives of ministries in expert organizations created with support from the government and the president.

Speaking of intersections of the most influential persons' participation in expert organizations and business structures, they are part of companies' management and are also members of the **International Arctic Forum** or of the **Arktika 2035 digital platform**[86]. Currently, the Arktika 2035 project is being overseen by the **Project Office for Arctic Development (PORA)** and its Expert Council that includes the biggest number of sampled persons who have no intersections with other interest groups. The PORA Expert Council is fairly diverse: it includes representatives of regional governments and city administrations of the Arctic regions, as well as researchers from regional higher education institutions whose work doesn't include the Arctic agenda.

The PORA Expert Council has experts in several fields: ecology, biology, indigenous peoples, climate change, international cooperation, etc. If we look at the Expert Council closely, we can see that this organization promotes the Arctic agenda and corresponding topics in the media, but does not form this agenda. The goal of PORA, according to the results of the analysis, is not to participate in making decisions on the Arctic, but rather to promote the agenda points formed by the executive and the legislative branches and by the business.

The most influential personality that can be seen as part of this group is **Elena Vladimirovna Kudryashova**.

86 At this moment, pages with experts and with the descriptions of the digital platform's functions have been deleted from the Arktika 2035 website. – URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20221007092143/https://arctic2035.ru/experts/; https://web.archive.org/web/20221007083132/https://www.arctic2035.ru/c/news/tekhnology/v-moskve-predstavili-tsifrovuyu-platformu-arktika-2035/.

Elena Vladimirovna KUDRYASHOVA

Rector of the Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov

Representation:

- Executive bodies
- Legislative bodies
- Business structures
- Expert bodies

Organizations:

- Board of Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic
- Public council of the Arctic zone
- Council to Develop Far East, Arctic and Antarctic at the Federation Council
- International scientific, technological, business and educational partnership Stable Development of the Russian Arctic Zone
- The Arktika 2035 digital platform

Affiliations:

- Member of the Council of the Association of Polar Explorers
- Member of RIAC
- Corresponding member of the Russian Ecological Academy
- Chairwoman for the National Arctic Scientific and Eductional Consortium

- Member of the coordinating council of the Russian Ministry of Education on humanities

Biography:

Born on April 14, 1961. In 1983, she graduated from the Arkhangelsk State Pedagogical University named after M.V. Lomonosov. In 1997, Kudryashova was awarded a Ph. D. degree; in 1999, she was awarded the title of professor. She worked as a teacher of History and English in the Rembuyevo eight-year school (Kholmogorsky District, Arkhangelsk Oblast). Since 1986, she has been elected an assistant, senior lecturer, docent and professor of the Arkhangelsk State Pedagogical University's philosophy department. From 1999 to date, Kudryashova has been a concurrent head of the philosophy department of the Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov. She held the positions of the head of division of science and tertiary education of the Arkhangelsk Region Administration (1999-2005), Deputy Director of the Department of Education and Science of the Arkhangelsk Oblast Administration (2005-2008), deputy head of the administration and vice-governor (2008-2010). She was first appointed to the position of the rector of the Northern (Arctic) Federal University in 2010. Then, in 2015, she was an advisor to the NAFU rector on strategic matters. She was appointed to the position of the rector of the Northern (Arctic) Federal University named after M.V. Lomonosov in 2016.

Summary:

Elena Kudryashova belongs to 4 out of 6 interest groups, but, unlike Aleksey Chekunkov or Vyacheslav Ruksha, she deals with scientific and educational matters in the Arctic. Kudryashova's career in

Arkhangelsk has been based on scientific and educational work. Northern (Arctic) Federal University must, according to Kudryashova, “supply science and staff, and help protect Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Arctic”. This way, the university led by Kudryashova must become a source of experts and researchers to promote the state agenda and interests. Apart from Arctic platforms, Kudryashova is a member of federal expert organizations like the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC); she’s also a member of the Coordinating Council on Humanities of the Ministry of Education.

We can see that expert platforms, institutions and research organizations play an important role in promoting interests of the state and other influence groups.

Security agencies

As the security agencies and intergovernmental organizations interest groups are the smallest ones (30 and 18 persons respectively), the distribution of stakeholders can't be compared with other reviewed interest groups.

Figure 10. Stakeholders from security agencies in other influence groups



Almost **half (46.7%) of the stakeholders of the Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic**, which is an organization that belongs to the "security agencies" group, are engaged in the work of other Arctic platforms. Such tight interaction

is due to the functions of the Commission, e.g. its involvement in development and implementation of strategic planning documents, preparation of recommendations for the State Commission for Arctic Development etc. Therefore all the members of the Commission ought to be involved in all the matters of the Arctic region, including fulfillment of strategic tasks, legislation, expertise and investments. We can see that the stakeholders from security agencies are pretty much evenly distributed among all the interest groups.

Why can the Security Council[87] be seen as a law enforcement agency? Originally designed as a substitute without any real powers, the Security Council gradually started becoming more and more important in decision making, largely due to the influence of Nikolay Patrushev. First, president Vladimir Putin, who is the head of the Security Council, has been conducting briefing sessions of the Council on a regular basis (once every two weeks on the average) in recent years. It means that members of the Council have the opportunity to communicate with the head of state on a regular basis, coordinating key decisions. Second, the Security Council participates in development of doctrinal state documents, including sectoral (Arctic is no exception) and military doctrines[88]. Third, the key decisions about starting the war in Ukraine were made by the Security Council. On 21 February, the Security Council approved the decision on recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, which became one of the reasons why the war in Ukraine started.

87 The Security Council is formed by the president in accordance with the Constitution of Russia. The Security Council Staff is an independent unit of the Presidential Administration of Russia. The Council's constant members are: Chairman Vladimir Putin; Deputy Chairman Dmitriy Medvedev; Secretary Nikolay Patrushev; as well as Chairman of the Government of Russia, Minister for Defense, Minister for Internal Affairs, Minister for Foreign Affairs, etc.

88 Stanovaya T. The Putin Regime Cracks // Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. – 2020. – URL: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/07/putin-regime-cracks-pub-81726

Meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation | kremlin.ru (CC BY 4.0)

In 2020, the status of the Security Council was confirmed in the Constitution as that of a consultative body that works on implementing the policies of the president of Russia that concern protection of national interests, state safety and prevention of inner and external threats. According to the Provision on the Security Council of Russia, its work is maintained by the Presidential Administration, which further highlights the fact that this body is integrated into the institution of presidency.

However, the significance of the Council can't be properly understood without analyzing the biography of **Nikolay Platonovich Patrushev**, who has been this body's secretary since 2008. Patrushev is not only an ideologue of traditional Russian values; he's also one of the architects of the Arctic policy, and he promotes the idea of expanding the Russian presence in the region.

Nikolay Platonovich PATRUSHEV

Secretary
of the Security Council
of Russia

Representation:

Security agencies

Affiliations:

- Chairman of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of Russia
- Member of the Military-Industrial Commission of Russia

Biography:

In 1974, Patrushev got education as a mechanical engineer; he graduated from the Department of Instrument Design of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. In 1975, he graduated from the Higher School of the KGB. In the 1970s and 1980s, he worked in the Leningrad Oblast KGB's counterintelligence division together with Vladimir Putin. In 1990, he started working in state security agencies of Karelia; until 1994, he was Minister of Security of the Republic of Karelia. Until 1998, he held leading positions in the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), then he briefly worked at the Presidential Administration of Russia, where he replaced Putin as the Chief of the Control Directorate; he also worked as the deputy head of the Presidential Administration for a short time. In the autumn of 1998, he returned to the FSB; in the spring of 1999, he became the first deputy of Vladimir Putin, who was now the head of the FSB.

After Putin was appointed the prime minister of Russia in 1999 (after which he ran as the president), Patrushev became the head of the FSB and remained in this position until 2008. He has been the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia since 2008.

Summary:

Patrushev is not only a colleague of Putin and one of the leaders of law enforcement in Russia; he is also a successful lobbyist of his family's interests. Dmitriy Patrushev, his elder son, has been the Minister of Agriculture of Russia since 2018; his younger son Andrey Patrushev has been the head of Center for Arctic Initiatives[89] since 2019, after he left Gazprom Neft, where he was Deputy CEO on Shelf Projects Development in 2015-2019. Also, in 2019 Andrey Patrushev became the head of the Arctic drilling company Avrora. The company includes several people from Gazprom Neft's top management. In 2021, the information spread that Avrora intended to purchase Investgeoservis, Novatek's biggest drilling contractor. 80% of the company's revenue comes from Novatek's contracts, especially the Arctic LNG 2 project that was supposed to become the key gas export project in the Asian-Pacific direction. In the summer of 2022, the deal was closed. It also turned out that the Avrora company was renamed Gazprom Shelfproekt. Despite the brand change, the company remains private and might become Gazprom's main contractor in Arctic drilling projects. In that case, Andrey Patrushev is going to become a potential beneficiary of the main oilfield service structure of the Russian Arctic.

89 The company presents itself as the "factory of ideas" in the fields of Arctic research and consulting: https://www.ark-in.ru/o-nas.html

The expanding influence that the Patrushev family has on the Russian Arctic politics became even clearer in 2020, when the Arctic Commission under the Russian Security Council was established. It is headed by **Dmitriy Anatolyevich Medvedev**, former president of Russia. Although Medvedev is only affiliated with the Arctic agenda as the head of the relevant Security Council commission, his political background (experience as the president and the head of government; connections with the president Vladimir Putin) make Medvedev a significant person in Russian politics.

Dmitriy Anatolyevich MEDVEDEV

Deputy chairman
of the Security Council of Russia

Representation:

- Security agencies

Organizations:

- Security Council of Russia's Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic

Affiliations:

- Chairman of the United Russia party
- Deputy chairman of the Presidential Council for Science and Education
- Head of the Skolkovo Foundation Board of Trustees
- Head of the Saint Petersburg State University Board of Trustees

Biography:

In 1987, Medvedev graduated from the Leningrad State University (LSU) Faculty of Law. His fellow students included **Konstantin Chuychenko**, currently the Russian Minister of Justice; **Aleksandr Gutsan**, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North-Western Federal District; and **Artur Parfenchikov**, Head of the Republic of Karelia. LSU is also the university Vladimir Putin graduated from. Medvedev entered politics as part of Anatoliy Sobchak's team. Sobchak was an LSU professor who became mayor of Saint Petersburg in 1991. Sobchak was Medvedev's thesis supervisor at the same time when Medvedev participated in Sobchak's election campaign. In 1990-1995, Medvedev was an advisor to Sobchak and worked as an expert for the Saint Petersburg international affairs committee, headed by Vladimir Putin. After Sobchak lost the Saint Petersburg mayoral election in 1996, Medvedev quit public service. He resurfaced in 1999 in Moscow, where he became deputy to Dmitriy Kozak, Chief of the Government Staff of Russia (at the time, Putin was the head of the Government). In 2000, Dmitriy Medvedev was deputy to Aleksandr Voloshin, Chief of the Presidential Administration of Russia, and headed Vladimir Putin's presidential campaign headquarters. After Putin was elected president in March 2000, Medvedev was the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, and then, from 2003 to 2005, the head of the Presidential Administration. From 2000 to 2008, Medvedev was a board member of Gazprom. In 2005, he was appointed as the first Deputy Prime Minister of Russia. In 2007, he was nominated as a presidential candidate by several parties, winning the 2008 election with 70.3% of the votes. He nominated Vladimir Putin for the position of prime minister. In 2012, Vladimir Putin became

president again, and Medvedev became prime minister; this move became known in Russian political history as “castling”, and 2008-2012 is frequently called the “tandem period” (Putin and Medvedev). In 2012, apart from becoming the premier, Medvedev also became the chairman of United Russia, the ruling party. Medvedev headed the Russian Government until January 2020. Then, he resigned and was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the Security Council (the position was created specifically for Medvedev). However, he retained his position as the chairman of the United Russia party. In the Security Council, Medvedev is heading several commissions: for migration policies, for epidemiological policies, for technological sovereignty issues. Also, Medvedev is Putin’s deputy in the Presidential Council for Science and Education.

Therefore the Security Council is one of the key interest coordination bodies in the Arctic security sphere. It should be noted that the influence of the law enforcement agencies on the Arctic matters is rather dispersed, as it would be difficult to pinpoint any law enforcement agencies other than the Security Council that are responsible for the Arctic projects. The analysis of stakeholders from various structures connected with the Arctic showcased representation of the following law enforcement agencies: 1) the FSB (including the head of the Border Service of the FSB); 2) the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR RF); 3) the National Guard of Russia; 4) the Federal Guard Service of Russia; 5) the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia; 6) Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia (EMERCOM); 7) the Ministry of Defence of Russia. Usually, law enforcement agencies are represented either by their directors (SVR, EMERCOM, Ministry of Defense) or by their first deputies.

Intergovernmental organizations

Half of the stakeholders from intergovernmental organizations (50%) are also members of other influence groups, with the exception of representation in business structures: none of the reviewed persons belongs to the reviewed business associations and companies.

Figure 11. Stakeholders from intergovernmental organizations in other influence groups



This kind of distribution is related to the fact that the intergovernmental organizations that were sampled for this study include diplomatic workers and heads of Arctic federal subjects. For example, governors of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Murmansk Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, the Komi Republic and the Republic of Karelia, as well as a Federation Council member from Novgorod Oblast, are all members of the **Barents Regional Council.** Due to this, there is a comparatively

high level of involvement in the executive and the expert influence groups due to the number of governors there.

It's hard to determine a single person with the most influence in this group. Among those who belong to **intergovernmental organizations and have high levels of power, five heads of federal subjects stand out**: Andrey Vladimirovich Chibis (Murmansk Oblast), Yuriy Vasilyevich Bezdudnyy (Nenets Autonomous Okrug), Artur Olegovich Parfenchikov (Republic of Karelia), Vladimir Viktorovich Uyba (Komi Republic), Aleksandr Vitalyevich Tsybulskiy (Arkhangelsk Oblast).

Promoting the interests of the Russian Arctic regions on the federal level has special significance, as tasks of implementing key infrastructural projects such as the NSR are handled by the regional level of the governing system. The fact that the Arctic zone of Russia is regulated by federal law leads to tighter networking between the heads of regions and federal structures of executive and legislative branches, as well as big federal business. Which is why to get a full picture of key federal stakeholders we must look at the extent to which heads of regions influence the decision-making. Representation of top 20 regional stakeholders will be reviewed in the next section.

IV.

ARCTIC STAKEHOLDERS IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT: the aspect of actors and economy

This section will be dedicated to the representation of regional stakeholders in the Arctic structures of Russia. We will review key stakeholders of the Arctic regional politics, and the anchor projects in the context of Russian regions. **In other words, this section is dedicated not only to the issue of regional Arctic politics, but also to interaction of federal influence groups with the regional aspect of the Arctic development in the context of biggest infrastructure and energy-related projects of the macroregion.**

By decree of the president № 296 “On the Land Territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation”, 9 subjects of the federation are considered Arctic regions: a) regions whose entire territories are considered Arctic: Murmansk Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, b) regions with some of municipalities considered Arctic: the Republic of Karelia, the Komi Republic, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Krasnoyarsk Krai and Arkhangelsk Oblast.

Also, some municipal districts are considered to be ‘Far North territories’. They frequently intersect with the Arctic, but not at all times: the Far North status reflects not just the geographic parameters, but also labor conditions, as this status influences a significant number of social benefits. For example, the entire Magadan Oblast and Kamchatka Krai are considered to be Far North territories. Also, most districts of Tomsk Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, and Khabarovsk Krai are registered as parts of the Far North. This status is also granted to various parts of other Russian regions.

We will concentrate on the territories considered to be Arctic, as well as those that are important for the development of the Northern Sea Route. Our focus will be on the heads of regions (governors), as they are the most important lobbyists of regional interests when it comes to Arctic issues.

Some of the 828 sampled individuals represent various structures (governmental, commercial, public, etc.) of Russian regions. Information on the federal subjects of the Russian Federation that have the highest representation in the Arctic agenda as far as the number of stakeholders in concerned is provided in Table 2.

Table 2.
Regional representation in Arctic structures: number of persons affiliated with regional organizations of government agencies

The region of Russia	Representation (number of persons sampled)	
Republic of Karelia		(31)
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug		(29)
Nenets Autonomous Okrug		(27)
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug		(26)
Komi Republic		(23)
Murmansk Oblast		(19)
Saint Petersburg		(19)
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)		(17)
Arkhangelsk Oblast		(11)
Primorsky Krai		(9)
Krasnoyarsk Krai		(7)
Kamchatka Krai		(6)

It should be noted that for some of the regions (for example, Karelia) most persons might be members of public or non-profit initiatives that only have limited influence on the Arctic politics (unlike state platforms for interest coordination). However, the fact that many persons are involved demonstrates the ambition of several regions as far as the Arctic agenda is concerned. The Republic of Karelia is the leader despite the fact that its pool of economic projects is not the biggest in the region. However, the region's high level of representation might be connected with its strategic location that might be even more significant due to its long border with Finland, a country that is planning to join NATO soon. **Also, the level of a region's representation might be affected by unique affiliations of the heads of regions, which will be discussed later.**

Nine governors of the subjects in the Arctic zone or of the subjects significant for the development of the Arctic are in the top 10 most influential Arctic stakeholders. This showcases the high significance of the regional aspect of the Arctic politics and the key role that the heads of regions play in promoting both the economic interests of their regions and particular infrastructure-related projects. Such projects can frequently be implemented to promote interests of elite groups that favor regional leaders or are associated with them.

It should be noted that half of the governors most involved in the Arctic issues represent northwest regions of Russia. Logically enough, only one governor represents the Siberian Federal District. Krasnoyarsk Krai is the District's only region that has territories in the Arctic. Predictably, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug also became one of the leaders, being the only region of the Ural Federal District with territories in the Arctic zone. Heads of the Far East regions are represented less than their colleagues from other parts of the

Russian Arctic, which is why they were not included in our sample of key regional Arctic lobbyists; the only exception is Roman Kopin, the Governor of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.

Table 3. Key governors who are lobbying Arctic interests

Head of the region	Region	Number of groups		Membership in structures	
Andrey Chibis	Murmansk Oblast	●●●●	(4)	●●●●●●	(6)
Yuriy Bezdudnyy	Nenets Autonomous Okrug	●●●	(3)	●●●●●	(5)
Dmitriy Artyukhov	Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug	●●●	(3)	●●●●	(4)
Artur Parfenchikov	Republic of Karelia	●●●	(3)	●●●●	(4)
Vladimir Uyba	Komi Republic	●●●	(3)	●●●●	(4)
Aleksandr Tsybulskiy	Arkhangelsk Oblast	●●●	(3)	●●●●	(4)
Roman Kopin	Chukotka Autonomous Okrug	●●	(2)	●●●	(3)
Aleksandr Uss	Krasnoyarsk Krai	●●	(2)	●●●	(3)

It should be clarified that while we were drawing up the final rating, we considered not only the number of structures that a stakeholder belongs to, but also the number of types of such structures (state, business, non-governmental organizations, the expert sector, etc.); in other words, an actor might belong to five structures, each being an expert body. We assume that a stakeholder that can promote interests on various levels at the same time (executive, legislative, business, NGOs, etc.) will have the biggest influence.

Arctic governors and regional priorities: a review of most significant cases

Andrey Chibis, Murmansk Oblast

The fact that Murmansk Oblast has the highest representation in the Arctic bodies might be related to the region's strategic significance. The comprehensive development of the Northern Sea Route started with the Murmansk Oblast. This region includes a warm water port (AO MMTP, whose key beneficiaries are SUEK and EuroChem owned by **Andrey Melnichenko),** the fourth port in terms of freight turnover in Russia, and the second in the northwest of Russia (after Saint Petersburg). The port has several cargo transit hubs and is one of the key ports for shipping of coal and gas. Murmansk Oblast also includes the Nornikel mining complex (Kola MMC) and hosts the main naval base and the headquarters of the Russian Northern Fleet (the city of Severomorsk that has the status of a closed town), as well as of FSUE Atomflot.

Andrey Chibis's own background is also very interesting. He's a typical modern Russian "technocrat" governor who never worked in the region before arriving there. In 2013-2019, he was Deputy Minister of Construction, Housing and Utilities of Russia. He started working at the Russian Government in 2006. For some time, Chibis's work in the ministry was overseen by **Dmitriy Kozak**, the current Deputy Head of Presidential Administration of Russia. Andrey Chibis is considered a strong lobbyist of his region's interests. For example, due to the need to optimize costs, the government decided to delay the construction of the Northern Latitudinal Railway in Yamal to speed up the completion of the Eastern Polygon (Far East) and the Murmansk railway junction.

The latter is extremely important for the region as a track leading to the container terminal that was being built in Murmansk Oblast as part of the NSR development strategy until 2035.

Yuriy Bezdudnyy, Nenets Autonomous Okrug

The second most represented governor in the Arctic bodies is the head of Nenets Autonomous Okrug, **Yuriy Bezdudnyy.** He comes from the KGB and served in security agencies until 2007. In 2019, he was the chief of staff of Aleksandr Tsybulskiy, then the governor of Nenets Autonomous Okrug, after which, in 2020, Bezdudnyy himself became the governor of the region.

Just like Murmansk Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug has strategic significance for the development of the Arctic. The region's waters contain the only offshore oil production platform in Russia's Arctic shelf: Prirazlomnoye field. **Andrey Patrushev**, son of the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia **Nikolay Patrushev**, oversaw this project's development. Another object located here is the Varandey terminal, one of the five top Arctic seaports in terms of freight turnover that is used to load oil for export from a Rosneft and Lukoil joint field. The terminal itself is owned by Lukoil and is the region's biggest tax payer.

Vladimir Uyba, the Komi Republic; Aleksandr Tsybulskiy, Arkhangelsk Oblast; Artur Parfenchikov, the Republic of Karelia; Dmitriy Artyukhov, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug

Next in the rating of stakeholder representation levels are four heads of regions: **Vladimir Uyba**, the head of Komi; **Aleksandr Tsybulskiy**, head of Arkhangelsk Oblast; **Artur Parfenchikov**, head of Karelia; and **Dmitriy Artyukhov**, head of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

Of all the Arctic regional leaders, **Dmitriy Artyukhov** is the one who is most affiliated with federal elites. From 2010 to 2018, he was deputy of the former Governor of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, **Dmitriy Kobylkin.** Kobylkin was the Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology of Russia from 2018 to 2020. Currently, Kobylkin is the head of the State Duma Environmental Committee. A former head of Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, he started his career in various companies connected with the energy sector. From 1996 to 2001, Kobylkin worked for Purneftegazgeologiya, a company whose shares were being actively bought by **Leonid Mikhelson**, currently one of the beneficiaries of Novatek along with **Gennady Timchenko** from Volga Group, a businessman closely affiliated with Vladimir Putin. From 2002 to 2010, Kobylkin held leading positions in Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug's Purovsky District. Kobylkin, Timchenko, Mikhelson and Artyukhov can be seen as members of the same influence group.

Artyukhov's high level of involvement in the Arctic bodies is also connected with Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug's importance for development of the Northern Sea Route. Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug is the location of Sabetta Arctic port that is used to transport liquefied natural gas through the NSR. It is also the location of the Yamal LNG, the biggest Tambeyskaya group of deposits liquefied natural gas factory in the Arctic that provides most of NSR's cargo. This is an international project: 50.1% of it is owned by Novatek, a Russian private company; 20% is owned by Total, a French company and to the Chinese company CNPC; 9.9% belongs to China's Silk Road Fund. Tankers with liquefied natural gas mostly go to Europe, although there are

plans to increase supplies to the East. Currently, liquefied natural gas is Russia's main gas export to Europe: during the nine months of 2022, the amount of this type of gas shipped to the EU grew by 50%. Another promising project in the region is Arctic LNG 2. It's located 70 km away from Sabetta, where the Utrenneye liquefied natural gas oilfield is going to be developed. The Arctic LNG 2 project is unique because 80% of the gas is going to be delivered to Asia-Pacific countries. The first line of the factory is expected to be launched in 2023 despite the refusal by a number of foreign companies to supply the equipment for the project.

The remaining personalities from the regional elite are heads of regions that are less significant for the development of the Arctic, but are connected with influential elite groups. **Aleksandr Tsybulskiy**, the Governor of Arkhangelsk Oblast, comes from the Ministry of Defense of Russia. From 2006 to 2017, Tsybulskiy held various positions in the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, where he got to work under **German Gref** (currently Chairman and CEO of Sberbank), **Elvira Nabiullina** (Chairwoman of the Bank of Russia) and **Andrey Belousov** (First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia).

Arkhangelsk Oblast has strategic and military significance for the Arctic due to the fact that it produces nuclear submarines (the Sevmash factory, the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center, etc.), and as a testing ground for submarines at the Belomorskaya naval base. Also, leading Arctic universities are located in the region. Arkhangelsk Oblast includes the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, location of a nuclear test site and large-scale disposals of nuclear waste, as well as the Franz Josef Land archipelago with its Arctic military base.

Another head of an Arctic region with a background in law enforcement is **Artur Parfenchikov**, the Head of the Republic of Karelia. He began his career in the prosecutor's office, then worked for the Federal Service of Court Bailiffs, becoming the head of it in 2008. Since 2017, he has been the Head of the Republic of Karelia. In his youth, Parfenchikov was taking the same course at the Leningrad State University (where Putin also studied) as the former president **Dmitriy Medvedev**, the Minister of Justice of Russia **Konstantin Chuychenko**, and **Aleksandr Gutsan**, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North-Western Federal District. Another person connected with Karelia is the Security Council of Russia's Secretary **Nikolay Patrushev,** who worked in the republic's security agencies in the early 1990s. Also, the family of Nikolay Patrushev's brother has business interests in Karelia.

Karelia's economic significance in the Arctic is much lower than that of many other regions, considering that only 38% of the republic's territory (6 municipalities) belong to the Arctic zone. However, Karelia plays a special role considering Finland's plan to join NATO, and the lengthy border the region has with Finland.

Of the four governors reviewed, **Vladimir Uyba,** the Head of the Komi Republic, is the least connected with law enforcement elites. His career is associated with medical administration. In the 1990's, Uyba oversaw the issues of cosmic medicine and of workers of atomic industry structures. This direction remained in the spotlight in 2004, when Uyba became the head of the Federal Medical-Biological Agency (FMBA), which he left in 2020 after he was

appointed to his Komi position. Uyba was, among other things, responsible for modernization of medical objects in closed cities and at nuclear power plants. He interacted with **Sergey Kiriyenko** (who was heading the Rosatom state corporation at the time) on those issues. Hence Uyba's appointment as the head of Komi is connected both with his work as a government official (nuclear medicine) and his experience of working with Kiriyenko, who is responsible for the Kremlin's personnel policy in the regions. Besides, Rosatom is one of the key corporations when it comes to the development of the Arctic. It deals with the NSR, nuclear icebreakers and a number of other spheres.

The Komi Republic is an important region when it comes to resources, and it has a well-developed fuel and energy complex. It's the location of Lukoil's capital-intensive businesses, including OOO Lukoil-Komi, which is the largest extracting facility in northwestern Russia. Also, the company owns oil refineries and supplies gas stations of the entire European North of Russia with petroleum products. There is a plan to start the construction of the Sosnogorsk–Indiga railway (a Soviet project known as Barentskomur) as part of the planned Indiga port in Nenets Autonomous Okrug. This project is being promoted by **Roman Trotsenko** (Aeon Corporation) who wants to create a new coal and logistics cluster in the Arctic. Also, Komi is the home to the legendary Vorkuta and its coal industry.

Roman Kopin, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug; Aleksandr Uss, Krasnoyarsk Krai

The next governors to be reviewed are **Roman Kopin**, the Governor of Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, and **Aleksandr Uss**, the Governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai (the only Siberian region whose territories are considered part of the Arctic).

Roman Kopin, the Governor of Chukotka, is one of the stalwarts of the list of governors, having headed the region since 2008. In general, the politician has been working in Chukotka since 1999. Before becoming the head of Chukotka, Kopin was the deputy of the famous businessman **Roman Abramovich**, who was the Governor of Chukotka from 2001 to 2008.

The key economic project of Chukotka is the Baimsky mining and processing plant, a large (9.5 million tons of copper and 16.5 million ounces of gold) deposit that was sold by businessmen Roman Abramovich and Aleksandr Abramov to the Kazakhstan company called Kaz Minerals. The asset was also claimed by Nornickel, but in the end the company failed to buy the deposit. It's assumed that the project will be powered by four floating nuclear power plants that are being built by Rosatom specifically for the Baimsky mining and processing plant. Due to sanctions, the project was postponed for one year, until 2028. Apart from its resource value, Chukotka is important as a reliable part of the NSR due to the fact that the navigation season there is the lengthiest one[90]. Also, the Chukchi Sea waters are divided between Russia and the US, which makes the region significant from the military and strategic point of view.

Aleksandr Uss, the Governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, assumed his duties in 2018. He comes from the local elites. Uss might be connected with the businessman **Oleg Deripaska** (a beneficiary of RUSAL), considering the story of how **Artyom Uss**, the governor's son, was arrested in Italy; it turned out that Artyom could

90 Stephenson S. R. et al. Projected 21st-century changes to Arctic marine access // Climatic Change. – 2013. – Vol. 118. – №. 3. – P. 893.

conduct financial transactions for the benefit of RUSAL. The company itself denies this. In 2022, the governor became a board member of Rosneft (Igor Sechin is the CEO); it might be due to the need for closer communication on the company's Arctic projects in the region.

In Krasnoyarsk Krai, Rosneft is implementing Vostok Oil, a project that is supposed to ensure the cargo turnover for the NSR. It's presumed that during the first stage (2024), 30 million tons will be shipped; and by 2030, this number will reach 100 million tons. For comparison, the NSR's total cargo turnover in 2021 was 34.85 million tons.

Vostok Oil's special feature is extraction of low density oil with low content of impurities. The Rosneft CEO **Igor Sechin's** meeting with the president of Russia was highly publicized. Sechin gave Putin a bottle of oil from the field and called it premium quality and "the best in the world". The idea of the project is to extract Taymyr oil that would not go through Transneft's pipelines so it doesn't get mixed with other raw materials; instead, it will be transported via a separate 800 kilometer pipeline that will lead to a terminal in the Yenisey Gulf. After that, the oil will be shipped on the ice class Arc7 tankers. This project is especially relevant due to the EU embargo on Russian oil, as it's going to be more difficult to limit tanker shipments of oil to Asia if the secondary sanctions against Russian businesses don't fully work. However, the key difficulty involves construction of icebreakers: the Vostok Oil fleet was supposed to be built by Samsung Heavy Industries, a South Korean company; the sanctions make it unclear whether the necessary equipment will be delivered.

Apart from Vostok Oil, Krasnoyarsk Krai is generally important as a region of operations by Nornickel (its beneficiary is **Vladimir Potanin**), a company that owns a fleet of six Arc7 icebreakers. Nornickel ships its cargo from the Dudinka port, owned by the company.

V.

THE RESULTS OF THE REVIEW OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS OF THE ARCTIC POLITICS

The analysis of key Arctic stakeholders demonstrated that the decisions that influence the region are highly centralized. The Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East functions as the main platform for the formation of the agenda. State Commission for Arctic Development and the Board of Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic. Executive bodies are closely connected and form a network with the legislative branch. For example, almost all the sampled governors (the executive branch) are represented in the Council to Develop the Far East, the Arctic and the Antarctic at the Federation Council. Such intersection of various types of activities further centralizes decision-making in the hands of representatives of the executive branch.

Paradoxically, the government decided not to distinguish the Arctic as a separate area of development within the bureaucratic structure, and united the Arctic agenda and the development of the Far East. This led to the situation when most representatives of the executive branch (especially those from the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic) have a background in Far East management. Previously, deputies of the head of this ministry used to be responsible for the development of another macroregion: the North Caucasus. This reflects the priority given by the state to people with experience of managing strategic territories as such rather than to specialists in the Far East or the Arctic in particular. As the federal executive branch can't single-handedly simultaneously develop the Far East and the Arctic within a single bureaucratic structure, many Arctic development tasks are outsourced to big business, state corporations and governors.

Many Arctic development tasks have been given to Rosatom, a company responsible for the NSR, construction of nuclear ice-breakers and supplying a number of infrastructure projects with energy.

Port of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula | Valery Kadnikov / Istock

At the same time, Novatek's cargo constitutes much of what goes through the Northern Sea Route, and Novatek is also the operator of Russia's most important Arctic projects: Yamal LNG and the Sabetta port. State resource corporations have not yet been brought to their projected capacities; we're talking about the Vostok Oil group of deposits by Rosneft, as well as the Shtokman field by Gazprom whose launch is postponed until 2029.

The key representatives of the government in the development of the Arctic are the governors of the Arctic regions. It makes sense considering the territorial and geographic context of Arctic management. The review of the stakeholders demonstrated that the governors of north-western regions have the most representation. This demonstrates that the European markets were prioritized for sales of Russian energy resources before the war in Ukraine started. The port city of Murmansk is informally considered the capital of the Arctic by the Russian state; Murmansk is the key transport and logistics hub of the Northern Sea Route.

The fact that the governors of north-western regions have the most representation indicates the difficulties of refocusing the NSR project, as well as the entire Russian resources export, in the Asian direction. For example, Aysen Nikolayev, the head of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), as well as Yakutia itself as one of the biggest regions to export raw materials to Asia, is represented much less than Karelia that plays a very limited role in the Arctic development. Due to this, Russia's desire to develop the NSR as one of the key elements of its "turn to the East" will demand a significant overhaul of personnel and economic policies.

Analysis of scientific and expert structures and their representation shows that they enjoy very little autonomy or influence on the Arctic agenda. Fundamentally, expert and research platforms don't develop their own Arctic development agenda, they just follow the goals and tasks defined by the Russian state. Experts and scientists basically service the priorities seen as important by the executive and the legislative branches.

VI.

CONCLUSION. KEY RISKS IN THE ARCTIC SPACE

The Arctic becomes the main territory of confrontation. The global climate change leads to the Arctic's increasing availability: there are more logistic routes, and more natural resources that can be extracted. This will increase the struggle for the region between the major powers: Russia, the United States, and China. The war in Ukraine will almost inevitably increase NATO's presence in the Arctic, which will legitimize Russia's further militarization of the region. At the same time, China will be increasing its icebreaking capabilities, so it can implement the Polar Silk Road project, which will inevitably lead to further differences between states. The interests that some non-Arctic countries (India, South Korea, France, etc.) have in the Arctic will further complicate the already difficult geopolitical environment.

Risks of a military conflict. Right now, the situation in the Arctic is already defined as a "security dilemma" because of the growth of both Russia's and NATO's military presence that will further grow due to the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Other Arctic countries will know less and less about Russia's activities in the Arctic, which will strengthen the feeling of mutual suspicion of growing military presence. All of this might lead to information asymmetry concerning each other's intentions. Lack of international arbitration bodies for military and political issues in the Arctic, as well as the fact that the US have not ratified UNCLOS, are going to lead to differences in interpretation of the legal regime of the Arctic waters. While Russia is going to be strengthening the strategic defense of the Arctic borders, the US might insist on the necessity of free navigation in the Arctic, which may add another dimension to the conflict in the region.

Sovereignization and isolation of Russia in the Arctic. Currently, Russia is already attempting to make the NSR navigation regime stricter. The Western sanctions against Russia due to the war in Ukraine isolate the

country both from acquiring critically important technologies and from cooperation with international organizations. According to Financial Times, Russia has to purchase old tankers to supply raw materials to Asia. To do that, it has to bypass sanctions[91], which increases the risks of environmental disasters in case of accidents involving obsolete vessels. Russia's infrastructure in the Arctic will become more and more technologically obsolete, which will also lead to increasing risks of environmental disasters and man-made accidents; elimination of their consequences will be significantly more difficult without international cooperation and mutual assistance structures.

Environmental and climate risks. Sanctions against Russia due to the war in Ukraine led to cessation of scientific cooperation in important directions. For example, a number of international scientific groups and projects created to study climate change in the Arctic can no longer work in Russia. Since the Russian Arctic space is at least half of the entire Arctic space, cessation of scientific cooperation will dramatically worsen the quality of monitoring of climate change in the Arctic. Preventive assessment of environmental risks in the development of energy-related projects is still extremely limited. Making SEA a binding instrument could increase the quality of environmental impact assessment, help plan elimination of consequences of accidents and prevent implementation of projects whose risks can't be mitigated technologically. However, the perspective of complete implementation of SEA by Arctic states remains very remote.

Technological hazards. This hazard type is related to possible appearance of abandoned deposits and infrastructure projects due to natural resources price shocks, gradual transition to "green" energy sources

91 Russia assembles 'shadow fleet' of tankers to help blunt oil sanctions // FT. – 2022. – URL: https://www.ft.com/content/cdef936b-852e-43d8-ae55-33bcbbb82eb6

and impossibility of accomplishing projects without Western investments and technologies. One example is the environmental disaster in Usolye-Sibirskoye (Irkutsk Oblast, Russia), where a polysilicon plant closed due to unprofitability caused by the 2008 financial crisis. This led to disruption of control over the industrial territory, and to a leak of harmful substances into the ground and into nearby rivers.

Corruption-related risks. The state policy towards the Arctic contains a number of corruption-related risks. First, there is a risk of inability to control Arctic project expenditures from the state budget. Currently, subsidies for the socioeconomic program of the Arctic zone of Russia can be traced, but it's only a small part of the budget expenditures that are aimed at the implementation of the Arctic strategy, of large investment projects, etc. Second, after the restriction of financial information, including information on management boards of Russian companies, we won't be able to assess the scale of investments of large commercial actors into the Arctic projects, or identify some of the Arctic business stakeholders. For example, Novatek concealed the data on management, and then on the company's board, after the beginning of the war. Third, the lack of NGOs and mass media outlets relevant to the Arctic that are not controlled by the government lowers possibilities of independent control over the implementation of Russia's Arctic policy.

Deindigenization[92] of the Arctic. Another significant risk that is relevant to any territory populated by small indigenous peoples is the risk of losing their identity, habitat and local culture. The representation of small peoples of the North and of the Arctic in Russia on the

92 Indigenization is a term that is used in a variety of ways depending on the context. It is the fact of making something more native; transformation of some service, idea, etc. to suit a local culture, especially through the use of more indigenous people in administration, employment, etc. – URL: https://archive.unescwa.org/indigenization

Children of Khanty reindeer herders play in sleds | Viktor Karasev / Photobank Lori

federal level is limited to a small number of cases such as Grigoriy Ledkov, member of the Federation Council. However, even when there is a legislative base that protects the interests of the indigenous peoples, their rights are frequently violated. Other than that, the indigenous peoples are affected by placement of mining and industries in the Arctic. As practice shows, these processes often take place without the indigenous peoples' consent[93]. Therefore the risks that indigenous peoples will have their interests unprotected and their rights violated increase proportionally to the increase of Russian extraction and industrial projects in the Arctic region.

93 Rohr J. Indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation. – IWGIA Report 18. – 2014. – https://www.iwgia.org/images/publications/0695_HumanRights_report_18_Russia.pdf – P. 41-44.

APPENDIX 1.

SAMPLING OF ORGANIZATIONS AND STRUCTURES

I. Legislative bodies:

1. Council of the Federation Committee on the Federal Structure, Regional Policies, Local Self-Governance and Affairs of the North
2. Council to Develop the Far East, the Arctic and the Antarctic at the Federation Council
3. State Duma Committee on Development of the Far East and the Arctic
4. The Working Group of the State Duma Committee on Development of the Far East and the Arctic on Improving the Legislation on State Guarantees and Compensation for People who Work and Live in the Regions of Far North and Similar Areas in the Arctic and the Far East
5. Expert Advisory Council under the State Duma Committee on Development of the Far East and the Arctic

II. Executive bodies:

1. Russian Ministry for Development of Far East and Arctic
2. The Public Council under the Russian Ministry for Development of the Far East and the Arctic
3. The Board of the Russian Ministry for Development of the Far East and the Arctic
4. Public Council of the Arctic Zone under the Russian Ministry for Development of the Far East and the Arctic
5. State Commission for Arctic Development

III. Business structures:

1. The RSPP Coordinating Council for Development of Northern Territories and the Arctic
2. Association of Trade and Industry Chambers of Northern (Subpolar) Territories and the Arctic Zone
3. International Scientific, Technological, Business and Educational Partnership “Stable Development of the Russian Arctic Zone”
4. AO Korporatsiya Razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka i Arktiki
5. Arctic Economic Council
6. Gazprom
7. Nornickel
8. FSUE Atomflot and Rosatom
9. Novatek
10. PJSC Rosneft Oil Company

IV. Expert bodies:

1. PORA expert council
2. Arktika 2035 digital platform
3. International Arctic Forum Organizing Committee

V. Security agencies

1. Security Council of Russia’s Interdepartmental Commission on Ensuring National Interests of Russia in the Arctic

VI. Intergovernmental organizations

1. The Arctic Council (Russia)
2. Barents Euro-Arctic Council (Russia)
3. Barents Regional Council (Russia)
4. Kolarctic CrossBorder Cooperation Project (Russia)

Arctida

Key Stakeholders of the Russian Arctic Politics

Electronic version, 2023.

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